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(UN)CORPORATE CRYPTO-GOVERNANCE
Carla L. Reyes*
Public blockchain protocols face a serious governance crisis. Thus far,
blockchain protocols have followed the path of early internet governance. If
the architects of blockchain protocols are not careful, they may suffer a
similar fate—increased governmental control, greater centralization, and
decreased privacy. As blockchain architects begin to consider better
governance structures, there is a legal movement underway to impose a
fiduciary framework on open-source software developers. If the movement
succeeds, the consequences for open-source software development could be
dire.
If arbitrarily imposed on blockchain communities without
consideration of variances among communities or the reality of how such
communities operate, the movement may quash the technology before it ever
matures. Further, in its present iteration, the argument for imposing
fiduciary duties is not limited to the blockchain context and could easily be
extended to other open-source projects. Such open-source projects have not
been subject to this fiduciary responsibility scheme and yet have been an
important force in industry and society for decades. Instead, this Article
argues that blockchain architects should consider adopting governance
contracts that rely on corporate governance models for inspiration. Such a
model would not obliterate the notion of fiduciary responsibilities in
blockchain governance but rather would allocate such responsibility in light
of the actual mechanics of the technology. The model also enables a scheme
that heightens responsibility for more actors in the ecosystem under certain
circumstances. Furthermore, contractually based governance systems offer
blockchain protocols an opportunity to adopt governance rules that reflect
the unique goals and culture of the protocols and their communities while
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appeasing the regulator’s need for a legally recognizable and responsible
hierarchy. Although there will be cultural challenges to governing
blockchain protocols under a corporate law model, this Article not only
concludes that navigating such challenges is possible but also offers an
opportunity to encourage new corporate governance structures in more
traditional enterprises.
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INTRODUCTION
During the last four decades,1 communities of open-source2 software
developers around the world have produced some of the most important

1. Siva Vaidhyanathan, Open Source as Culture—Culture as Open Source, in OPEN
SOURCE JAHRBUCH 2005: ZWISCHEN SOFTWAREENTWICKLUNG UND GESELLSCHAFTSMODELL
359, 361 (Bernd Lutterbeck et al. eds., 2005) (tracing the beginning of the open-source
software movement to Richard Stallman’s work in the 1970s); see also David Bretthauer,
Open Source Software: A History, INFO. TECH. & LIBR., Mar. 2002, at 3, 3 (tracing the
beginning of the open-source software movement to Richard Stallman’s work on GNU in the
1970s).
2. Although often used interchangeably, the terms “open-source software” and “free
software” reflect very different meanings to the communities that use those terms. Opensource software generally refers to software that is available without an economic cost, while
free software is used to describe software imbued with certain ideals. See Yochai Benkler,
Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and “The Nature of the Firm,” 112 YALE L.J. 369, 371 n.2 (2002);
Vaidhyanathan, supra note 1, at 359 n.1. Although many public blockchain protocols reflect
libertarian values, it is impossible to say that every blockchain protocol does. Therefore, I
adopt the term open-source software in this Article to broadly encompass any blockchain
protocol that is made available under an open-source software license, irrespective of any
political ideals the surrounding community holds.
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technological advances in computing that society enjoys today.3 Many such
communities create this software with even less hierarchy than today’s
internet governance systems.4 Although many commercial entities,
including Facebook, profit from the advances made by open-source software
developers, many of the contributors to open-source projects do not.5
Instead, many open-source software developers contribute to a project for a
variety of other, less tangible, motives, including career advancement, love
of the work, the joy in solving a puzzle, or the desire to simply solve a
problem that makes their lives as software users easier.6 Whatever the
motivations for their contributions, without open-source software
development, everyday computer users would not enjoy the benefits of key
computing software such as HTML,7 Apache,8 and Linux,9 among others.
A relatively new open-source software project, the Bitcoin blockchain,
once again demonstrates the power of open-source software innovation.10
The Bitcoin blockchain,11 which powers a peer-to-peer payment transaction
3. Vaidhyanathan, supra note 1, at 362 (“While Linux and the GNU (Free Software)
project have garnered the most attention in accounts of Open Source development, the
protocols and programs that enable and empower the e-mail, the World Wide Web, IRC, and
just about every other activity on the Internet all emerged from community-based project
teams, often ad-hoc and amateur.”).
4. GEORGE DAFERMOS, GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES OF FREE/OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE
DEVELOPMENT 187 (2012).
5. See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 2, at 372–73 (“Programmers do not generally participate
in a[n] [open-source] project because someone who is their boss instructed them, though some
do. They do not generally participate in a project because someone offers them a price, though
some participants do focus on long-term appropriation through money-oriented activities, like
consulting or service contracts. But the critical mass of participation in projects cannot be
explained by the direct presence of a command, a price, or even a future monetary return,
particularly in the all-important microlevel decisions regarding selection of projects to which
participants contribute.”).
6. See generally PEKKA HIMANEN, THE HACKER ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF THE
INFORMATION AGE (2001); GLYN MOODY, REBEL CODE: THE INSIDE STORY OF LINUX AND THE
OPEN SOURCE REVOLUTION (2001) (discussing how coding skills improve through peer
review); Bengt Holmstrom, Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective, 66 REV.
ECON. STUD. 169 (1999) (discussing job-market signaling); Justin Pappas Johnson, Open
Source Software: Private Provision of a Public Good, 11 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 637
(2002); Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Some Simple Economics of Open Source, 50 J. INDUS.
ECON. 197 (2002); Eric von Hippel, Innovation by User Communities: Learning from Open
Source Software, 42 SLOAN MGMT. REV. 82 (2001) (discussing user needs).
7. See generally TIM BERNERS-LEE, WEAVING THE WEB: THE ORIGINAL DESIGN AND
ULTIMATE DESTINY OF THE WORLD WIDE WEB BY ITS INVENTOR (1999) (detailing, among
other things, the open-source development of HTML as spearheaded by Tim Berners-Lee).
8. See generally APACHE SOFTWARE FOUND., https://apache.org/index.html
[https://perma.cc/29P6-5AFX] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020).
9. See generally Bretthauer, supra note 1, at 3 (detailing the history of Linux’s opensource development).
10. Get
Started
with
Bitcoin,
BITCOIN PROJECT,
https://bitcoin.org/en/
[https://perma.cc/2HDL-QG4A] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020) (“Bitcoin is open-source; its
design is public, nobody owns or controls Bitcoin and everyone can take part.”).
11. Generally speaking, the Bitcoin software, protocol, and network are referenced using
the uppercase “Bitcoin” while the lowercase “bitcoin” refers to individual units of
cryptocurrency. Angela Walch, The Bitcoin Blockchain as Financial Market Infrastructure:
A Consideration of Operational Risk, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 837, 846 n.41 (2015).
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system, and other public blockchains12 are software development projects
deeply rooted in the open-source culture and governance ethos.13 Blockchain
communities often present a metanarrative of blockchain protocols as a
“libertarian dream which aims at reducing the control of governments on the
economy.”14 This narrative originates in the history of the “Cypherpunks,”
a group of cryptographers working in a multistakeholder, collaborative
manner to produce technologically innovative tools allowing for regulation
without sacrificing privacy.15 According to the Cypherpunk manifesto, the
group believed: “Privacy is necessary for an open society in the electronic
age. . . . We cannot expect governments, corporations, or other large,
faceless organizations to grant us privacy . . . . We must defend our own
privacy if we expect to have any.”16 To defend privacy, the Cypherpunks
believed that individuals needed the capability to send encrypted
communications and to conduct anonymous financial transactions.17 The
Bitcoin blockchain emerged from efforts to create an anonymous transaction
system, and the Cypherpunk culture of civil disobedience and libertarianism
continues to echo through many of the various blockchain ecosystems and

12. Generally speaking, a blockchain is “a linked list that is built with hash-pointers
instead of pointers.” ARVIND NARAYANAN ET AL., BITCOIN AND CRYPTOCURRENCY
TECHNOLOGIES: A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION 11 (2016). “So each block not only tells
us where the value of the previous block was, but it also contains a digest of that value, which
allows us to verify that the value hasn’t been changed. We store the head of the list, which is
just a regular hash-pointer that points to the most recent data block.” Id. The “Bitcoin
blockchain” refers specifically to the protocol of the native cryptocurrency bitcoin. When
people refer to “the blockchain” or “The Blockchain,” they often mean to refer to the Bitcoin
blockchain. Otherwise, it is more appropriate to speak of blockchain technology, or a
blockchain protocol, as there are many variants of the technology and a number of protocols
in operation. A “protocol,” for its part, is “a set of instructions for the compilation and
interaction of objects.” ALEXANDER R. GALLOWAY, PROTOCOL: HOW CONTROL EXISTS AFTER
DECENTRALIZATION 75 (2004). Blockchains are a form of network protocols. Generally, a
“network protocol” simply sets the rules that allow networked computers (nodes) to
communicate with each other. Will Warren, The Difference Between App Coins and Protocol
Tokens, MEDIUM: 0X BLOG (Feb. 2, 2017), https://blog.0xproject.com/the-differencebetween-app-coins-and-protocol-tokens-7281a428348c [https://perma.cc/PA8N-NSTA]. For
example, the Internet Protocol is a network protocol that defines the digital message formats
and rules for communication among connected computers. Internet Protocol (IP),
TECHOPEDIA (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.techopedia.com/definition/5366/internet-protocolip [https://perma.cc/ZNG7-9HJS]. Email is also built on a protocol that allows users to
communicate with one another; “[i]t’s just a way for two computers to talk to one another.”
Ryan Shea, When to Use Protocol Tokens, MEDIUM (Nov. 13, 2017),
https://medium.com/@ryanshea/protocol-tokens-1ed44fa89453
[https://perma.cc/6HA5BCWE].
13. HENNING DIEDRICH, ETHEREUM: BLOCKCHAINS, DIGITAL ASSETS, SMART CONTRACTS,
DECENTRALISED AUTONOMOUS ORGANISATIONS 254 (2016) (explaining that the Bitcoin
blockchain and other public blockchains have their roots in the Cypherpunk tradition).
14. See Primavera De Filippi & Benjamin Loveluck, The Invisible Politics of Bitcoin:
Governance Crisis of a Decentralised Infrastructure, INTERNET POL’Y REV., Sept. 2016, at 1,
3.
15. DIEDRICH, supra note 13, at 254.
16. Id. at 255 (quoting Eric Hughes, A Cypherpunk Manifesto, ACTIVISM.NET (Mar. 9,
1993), https://activism.net/cypherpunk/manifesto.html [https://perma.cc/2Q9Y-VBFZ]).
17. Id. at 259.
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their participants.18 Blockchain technology is poised to follow in the
footsteps of other earlier open-source projects by providing powerful benefits
to society and the economy. By 2018, the leading public blockchains19
powered around $20 billion in economic activity, or roughly 0.025 percent
of the global gross domestic product.20
Despite its contributions to technological innovation and the economy, the
open-source software development movement is currently under attack. An
emerging line of legal literature suggests that open-source software
developers should be subject to fiduciary law for the mere act of contributing
code to an open project.21 Lawsuits claim that open-source software
developers owe users monetary damages because the developers did not
make certain changes to the software that a particular group of users
wanted.22 At least one key contributor to the Ethereum blockchain ceased
making contributions for fear of reprisal under the laws of his home
jurisdiction.23 Although those attacks currently focus on blockchain software
development, the literature seems to pay little attention to the broader
potential impact on open-source software development generally. In other
words, a legal movement is afoot that purportedly seeks to punish individual
blockchain developers for a broad swath of undefined behavior without
considering the broader impact on, or the culture and context of, the opensource software movement. Because this proposal for regulating opensource developers already caused negative externalities that threaten the
survival of open-source software projects, such as developers abandoning
their work,24 they are unlikely to be the optimal governance solution.25
18. Id. at 259–60 (describing developments like Zcash and Ethereum as the next steps in
the Cypherpunk vision for distributed ledger technology (DLT)).
19. Namely, the Bitcoin blockchain and the Ethereum protocol.
20. WORLD ECON. FORUM, DEEP SHIFT: TECHNOLOGY TIPPING POINTS AND SOCIETAL
IMPACT 24 (2015), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GAC15_Technological_Tipping_
Points_report_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4QG-VEV9]. The World Economic Forum
predicts that 10 percent of global gross domestic product will be stored on blockchain
technology by 2027. Id.
21. See, e.g., Angela Walch, In Code(rs) We Trust: Software Developers as Fiduciaries
in Public Blockchains, in REGULATING BLOCKCHAIN: TECHNO-SOCIAL AND LEGAL
CHALLENGES 58 (Philipp Hacker et al. eds., 2019) [hereinafter Walch, In Code(rs) We Trust];
Angela Walch, Call Blockchain Developers What They Are: Fiduciaries, AM. BANKER (Aug.
9, 2016), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/call-blockchain-developers-what-theyare-fiduciaries [https://perma.cc/J5P3-ZS5U] [hereinafter Walch, Call Blockchain Developers
What They Are].
22. Complaint at 3–4, Brola v. Nano, No. 1:18-cv-02049 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2018). The
complaint specifically alleges the failure of Nano’s core development team to “rescue fork”
the Nano protocol in support of users’ claims for compensatory and equitable relief—
including the return of funds lost at the BitGrail exchange. Id.
23. Rachel Rose O’Leary, Ethereum Developer Resigns as Code Editor Citing Legal
Concerns, COINDESK (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/ethereum-developerresigns-as-code-editor-citing-legal-concerns/ [https://perma.cc/7Q9E-G9X9].
24. See id.
25. Yochai Benkler made a similar point regarding property law and peer production,
explaining that
[r]egulators concerned with fostering innovation may better direct their efforts
toward providing the institutional tools that would help thousands of people to
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On the other hand, experts concur that many public blockchains face a
governance crisis.26 If public blockchain protocols cannot resolve this
governance crisis, these governance failures may lead to blockchain
architectures that produce the crypto equivalent of the Facebook–Cambridge
Analytica privacy scandal.27 Twenty years ago, Professor Lawrence Lessig
predicted that this turn of events would occur unless greater consideration
was given to the governance processes that presided over the architecture of
the internet. Specifically, Professor Lessig warned:
What if an architecture emerges that permits constant monitoring; an
architecture that facilitates the constant tracking of behavior and
movement. What if an architecture emerged that would costlessly collect
data about individuals, about their behavior, about who they wanted to
become. And what if the architecture could do that invisibly, without
interfering with an individuals [sic] daily life at all?28

Arguably, society’s collective failure to create better governance
mechanisms for the internet and its applications resulted in the fulfillment of
Lessig’s dire predictions.29
To allow open-source blockchain projects to retain governance
mechanisms endogenous to their unique cultures and visions and to protect
open-source software development communities more broadly, this Article
argues that blockchain communities should consider looking to corporate law
collaborate without appropriating their joint product, making the information they
produce freely available rather than spending their efforts to increase the scope and
sophistication of the mechanisms for private appropriation of this public good as
they now do.
Benkler, supra note 2, at 446.
26. As discussed further below, two types of governance are relevant to blockchains: onchain and off-chain governance. See infra notes 77–84 and accompanying text. On-chain
governance refers to attempts to hard code governance rules into the consensus mechanism
used to confirm transactions conducted on the protocol, while off-chain governance refers to
the process that takes place outside of the code by which the software developers and
blockchain validators propose, create, and implement updates, upgrades and other changes to
the software. Wessel Reijers et al., Now the Code Runs Itself: On-Chain and Off-Chain
Governance of Blockchain Technologies, TOPOI, Dec. 17, 2018, at 1, 2.
27. Phillip Tracy, The Fallout from Facebook’s Cambridge Analytica Data Crisis, DAILY
DOT (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.dailydot.com/debug/facebook-cambridge-analyticatimeline/ [https://perma.cc/S73E-7T8L]. A blockchain protocol, then, is a network protocol
that defines the rules that enable networked computers to exchange value on a peer-to-peer
basis.
28. Lawrence Lessig, The Laws of Cyberspace 15 (Apr. 3, 1998) (unpublished
manuscript), https://cyber.harvard.edu/works/lessig/laws_cyberspace.pdf [https://perma.cc/
WC2B-VTLT].
29. See generally JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?:
ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD (2006); DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE STUDIES: AN
OVERVIEW (2007); JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT
(2009); Roger A. Clarke, Information Technology and Dataveillance, 31 COMM. ACM 498,
499 (1988) (describing “dataveillance” as “the systematic use of personal data systems in the
investigation or monitoring of the actions or communications of one or more persons”);
Margaret Hu, Algorithmic Jim Crow, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 633 (2017) (describing the use of
the widespread data available via internet connectivity to enforce a technologically driven Jim
Crow regime).
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for models of governance that will be respected by the law yet remain
customizable. Specifically, participants in public blockchain systems30
should contractually delineate governance mechanisms, modeling elements
of corporate governance. This Article further argues that using corporate
governance as inspiration for blockchain governance also provides important
insight into corporate law.31 Blockchain technology32 proponents often
herald the technology as a tool for disrupting the corporate sphere and further
democratizing society; however, more functional similarities exist between
blockchains and corporations than are often acknowledged. Indeed,
proponents of the company in the nineteenth century argued for recognition
of their innovation as an enabling technology.33 The company might be
viewed as a technology because it enables a uniquely effective method to
ensure productive collaboration toward a collectively profitable end.34
Blockchain technology does the same thing through computer code.
30. The choice of the word “systems” is purposeful. I have repeatedly advocated for a
comparative and systems analysis–based framework for analyzing the intersection of law,
distributed ledger technology, and blockchain technology. Carla L. Reyes, If Rockefeller Were
a Coder, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 373, 390 (2019) [hereinafter Reyes, Rockefeller]; see also
Carla L. Reyes, Conceptualizing Cryptolaw, 96 NEB. L. REV. 384, 391 (2017) [hereinafter
Reyes, Conceptualizing Cryptolaw].
31. The nature of both comparative enterprise and systems analysis provide endogenous
impetus for considering the inverse of each question related to substance, structure, and
culture. Comparative law’s core mission is reciprocal in nature. “The real aim of comparative
law is to offer insight and perspective so that we are better equipped to reflect critically about
ourselves and our own legal culture.” Edward J. Eberle, The Method and Role of Comparative
Law, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 451, 471–72 (2009). Systems analysis, for its part,
views a system as consisting of coordinated and interconnected elements that “operate as a
unified whole to serve a given function or purpose.” Tamara Belinfanti & Lynn Stout,
Contested Visions: The Value of Systems Theory for Corporate Law, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 579,
599 (2018). Systems analysis recognizes that these interconnected elements influence each
other even as they work together. Id. Furthermore, systems theory teaches that each system
may be part of another, larger system. Id. Under these premises, at every intersection of law
and blockchain technology exists the potential for a two-way impact exchange, wherein the
law impacts blockchain and its code, while blockchain technology, its code, and the
possibilities it enables may inversely offer lessons for the law. In the context of this Article,
the implication, therefore, is that if corporate governance mechanisms offer lessons for
blockchain governance, blockchain protocols may hold lessons for corporate law.
32. “In general, the term ‘distributed ledger technology’ refers to all initiatives and
projects that are building systems to enable the shared control over the evolution of data
without a central party, with individual systems referred to as ‘distributed ledgers.’ If one
wants to describe a system that has global data diffusion and/or uses a data structure of chained
blocks, one should call it a ‘blockchain.’” GARRICK HILEMAN & MICHEL RAUCHS, GLOBAL
BLOCKCHAIN BENCHMARKING STUDY 24 (2017), https://www.ey.com/Publication/
vwLUAssets/ey-global-blockchain-benchmarking-study-2017/$FILE/ey-global-blockchainbenchmarking-study-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9MC-Q422]. Generally speaking, in my
work, I prefer to consider legal issues at the intersection of all the variants of DLT and
blockchain technology. So I usually adopt the term DLT with the usual caveats. This Article,
however, is specifically concerned with the governance of public, open-source blockchain
protocols. Thus, this Article generally refers to “blockchain protocols.” Nevertheless, the
Article intends to capture the full range of those protocols, without regard to the consensus
mechanism used (e.g., proof of work, proof of stake, etc.).
33. JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT HISTORY OF
A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA, at xx (2003).
34. Id.
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Blockchain protocols and their proponents reflect this reality without
realizing it. For example, masternode protocols, in their efforts to create a
governance structure enabling efficient decision-making, intuitively copy a
partnership structure.35 Other blockchain protocol architects explain their
code by analogizing them to corporations.36 In fact, some protocols, smart
contracts, and “decentralized autonomous organizations” (DAOs) could be
structured as business trusts that receive corporate treatment without actually
incorporating.37 Other protocol architects are exploring ways to formally
incorporate their projects.38 Regardless of whether protocol architects intend
to organize a specific protocol as a legally recognized business entity or the
comparison is more theoretical, the entire range of scenarios points to the
broader potential of the corporate governance experience to shape blockchain
protocol governance. Indeed, many open-source projects, including some
blockchain ecosystems,39 rely on various formal and informal governance
mechanisms that include both formal incorporation and contractual
governance.40

35. See, e.g., Mitja Rutnik, What Is Dash?—a Short Guide, ANDROID AUTHORITY (Feb.
18, 2018), https://www.androidauthority.com/what-is-dash-820943/ [https://perma.cc/X3JYBU9R ] (describing masternodes that stake cryptocurrency in exchange for voting power used
to make decisions about the protocol).
36. See, e.g., Vitalik Buterin, Opinion, Bootstrapping a Decentralized Autonomous
Corporation: Part I, BITCOIN MAG., https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/bootstrapping-adecentralized-autonomous-corporation-part-i-1379644274/ [https://perma.cc/AR7M-CFVG]
(last visited Mar. 17, 2020) (“Bitcoin has 21 million shares, and these shares are owned by
what can be considered Bitcoin’s shareholders.”); Daniel Larimer, Overpaying for Security:
The Hidden Costs of Bitcoin, LET’S TALK BITCOIN! NETWORK (Sept. 7, 2013),
https://letstalkbitcoin.com/is-bitcoin-overpaying-for-false-security [https://perma.cc/S6CCYUZC] (“Think of a crypto-currency as shares in a Decentralized Autonomous Corporation
(DAC) where the source code defines the bylaws.”).
37. See generally Reyes, Rockefeller, supra note 30 (arguing that blockchain protocols,
certain smart contracts, and DAOs can be structured as business trusts in order to achieve
entity recognition and ensure limited liability). This Article’s proposal for a contractual
governance structure modeled after corporate governance mechanisms could be built into the
trust instrument that creates the business trust. It could, of course, be part of an algorithmic
entity that is a corporation or LLC as well. See generally Lynn M. LoPucki, Algorithmic
Entities, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 887 (2018). But it need not be. It could just be a contract
employed as a governance tool for the community.
38. See, e.g., Xander Landen, Vermont Bullish on Blockchain as New Law Takes Effect,
VTDIGGER (Aug. 28, 2018), https://vtdigger.org/2018/08/28/vermont-bullish-blockchainnew-law-takes-effect/ [https://perma.cc/QPJ8-ZSWX] (describing Vermont’s enactment of a
law enabling “blockchain-based limited liability companies” and several companies taking
advantage of the law); Ryan Taylor, Dash Core Group Legal Structure Details, DASH F. (Aug.
1, 2018), https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/dash-core-group-legal-structure-details.39848/
[https://perma.cc/9L7V-M6XN] (noting that the Dash Trust chose New Zealand “for its strong
reputation and well-defined trust laws”).
39. See, e.g., Governance Guidelines, CORDA NETWORK FOUND., https://corda.network/
governance/governance-guidelines [https://perma.cc/NVX7-G8BS] (last visited Mar. 17,
2020).
40. See generally DALIA TOPELSON RITVO ET AL., ORGANIZATION & STRUCTURE OF OPEN
SOURCE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES (2017), https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/
handle/1/30805146/2017-03-24_governance.pdf [https://perma.cc/37VL-FL63]; Adam Fish
et al., Birds of the Internet, 4 J. CULTURAL ECON. 157, 163 (2011).
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This Article wrestles with the potential to create “(un)corporate cryptogovernance”—blockchain governance modeled on corporate government
paradigms but implemented through contracts—in three parts.41 Part I
examines the governance crisis faced by blockchain technology protocols
generally and public blockchain protocols in particular. It then explores the
similar experience in internet governance, which increasingly suffers from
fragmentation and pressures from sovereign nations. Part II examines the
parallels between the internet and the blockchain protocol governance
experience and argues that corporate law offers governance guideposts42 for
solving the blockchain governance crisis. Part II argues, however, that such
guideposts should be adapted and adopted by contract to uphold the ethos of
the community, promote endogenous priorities, and enhance legitimacy. Part
III examines the areas of blockchain technology governance that might learn
most from corporate governance, including enhanced responsibilities of
certain decision makers and the gatekeeping role of influential groups,
individuals, and industry institutions. This Article concludes by considering
the cultural challenges to governing blockchain protocols through
(un)corporate crypto-governance, asserting that navigating such challenges
is not only possible but also offers an opportunity to encourage new corporate
governance structures in more traditional enterprises.

41. This Article follows the “cryptolaw” for blockchain technology analysis framework,
asking what lessons can be drawn from corporate governance for governance of public
blockchain protocols. For a full explanation of the cryptolaw for the DLT analysis framework,
see generally Reyes, Conceptualizing Cryptolaw, supra note 30. For a summary version, see
generally Carla L. Reyes, Cryptolaw for Distributed Ledger Technologies: A Jurisprudential
Framework, 58 JURIMETRICS 283 (2018). This question is the inverse of the question
considered in the first paper of this series. See generally Reyes, Rockefeller, supra note 30.
42. To be clear, this Article does not argue that blockchain protocols should be subject to
corporate law unless the participants in a particular blockchain project formally incorporate.
For reasons that will become clear, this Article specifically and intentionally argues for leaving
blockchain governance to private ordering via contracts and encourages those creating such
contracts to look to corporate governance structures for inspiration because some of the
concepts and structures used in corporate governance may offer useful constructs for
blockchain governance. See infra Part II.B. This differs markedly from the only other study
of the potential use of corporate law for blockchain governance, which advocates for an
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)–type central regulator to
oversee the imposition of a uniform corporate code to all blockchain protocols. See generally
Phillip Hacker, Corporate Governance for Complex Cryptocurrencies?: A Framework for
Stability and Decision Making in Blockchain-Based Organizations, in REGULATING
BLOCKCHAIN: TECHNO-SOCIAL AND LEGAL CHALLENGES, supra note 21, at 140. As explained
more fully below, this Article’s preference for a private ordering solution follows the
arguments and logic of its predecessor article, “If Rockefeller Were a Coder,” because private
ordering enables transparent, predictable, and endogenously chosen approaches to roles,
responsibility, and liability in the governance ecosystem. See infra note 154. Indeed, adopting
governance contracts reflects my preference for a business trust form for blockchain-based
business entities. Business trusts “combine the pattern of asset partitioning provided by the
traditional corporation—strong entity shielding and full limited liability—with the greater
flexibility in internal structure that the corporate form has evolved to offer.” Henry Hansmann
et al., The New Business Entities in Evolutionary Perspective, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 5, 13–14.
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I. THE OFF-CHAIN GOVERNANCE PROBLEM
Public blockchain protocol governance finds itself in a moment (or era) of
crisis.43 Eschewing the very notion of formal governance and claiming
decentralization eradicated any need for it, individuals developing public
blockchain protocols often created governance structures without viewing
them as such.44 As a result, the broader blockchain technical community is
only beginning to investigate theories of blockchain governance in earnest.45
To date, blockchain protocol governance predominately follows the same
path as internet governance: dominance by key individuals followed by the
establishment of quasi-governance organizations with overlapping missions,
politicization, and varying degrees of legitimacy.46
At this point, however, blockchain protocol governance remains
sufficiently nascent that it has not yet suffered the same degree of
recentralization and interference by national governments as internet
governance. In other words, there may still be time to develop governance
guardrails that quell some of the conflicts of interest underlying current
public blockchain protocols.47 This Part first discusses some of the
governance failures suffered by the most prominent public blockchains. This
Part then uncovers the parallels between the current blockchain governance
experience and the internet governance experience, demonstrating the perils
that await blockchain governance if its development continues as
haphazardly as it has to date, and exposing the importance of formalizing
workable blockchain governance.

43. See De Filippi & Loveluck, supra note 14, at 2.
44. Michael Abramowicz, The Very Brief History of Decentralized Blockchain
Governance, 22 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 3) (“A
blockchain is typically the result of a decentralized process for determining which transactions
should be included on a ledger, and some may thus have an ideological aversion to a
centralized, hierarchical governance scheme for determining how the protocol that generates
this process is defined.”).
45. Fred Ehrsam, Blockchain Governance: Programming Our Future, MEDIUM:
CRYPTOCURRENCY (Dec. 1, 2017), https://medium.com/@FEhrsam/blockchain-governanceprogramming-our-future-c3bfe30f2d74 [https://perma.cc/EL9Z-MXBJ]; Vlad Zamfir,
Against On-Chain Governance, MEDIUM (Dec. 1, 2017), https://medium.com/
@Vlad_Zamfir/against-on-chain-governance-a4ceacd040ca [https://perma.cc/MX65-HB8P].
Academic efforts are also beginning to formally organize around the study of blockchain
governance. See, e.g., Wharton Cyrptogovernance Workshop, U. PA., https://
zicklincenter.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Wharton-CryptogovernanceWorkshop-7-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/SCP6-XGQC] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020); see also
CRYPTOECONOMIC SYSTEMS, https://cryptoeconomicsystems.pubpub.org/ [https://perma.cc/
9BKM-M2WD] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020).
46. See discussion infra Part I.B.
47. Such conflicts of interest include those that led to the successful 51 percent Ethereum
Classic attack. See Gareth Jenkinson, Ethereum Classic 51% Attack—the Reality of Proof of
Work, COINTELEGRAPH (Jan. 10, 2019), https://cointelegraph.com/news/ethereum-classic-51attack-the-reality-of-proof-of-work [https://perma.cc/4BZE-ZVKH] (indicating that members
of the Ethereum Classic community believed “the attack was ‘most likely selfish mining’
noting that they had not detected any double spends at the time”).
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A. The Public Blockchain Protocol Governance Experience
In response to the unauthorized movement of tokens valued at $55 million
from a decentralized venture capital fund called “the DAO,”48 the Ethereum
protocol underwent a hard fork49 in 201650 that split the core code into
Ethereum Classic and Ethereum.51 The Ethereum hard fork wracked the
Ethereum community with controversy,52 damaging the protocol’s
legitimacy in the eyes of many, both within and outside the technical
community.53 On August 1, 2017, the Bitcoin blockchain also experienced
a hard fork54 that split it into Bitcoin and Bitcoin Cash.55 A debate over how
48. Carla L. Reyes et al., Distributed Governance, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. ONLINE 1, 6
(2017).
49. A “hard fork” occurs when an update to the software leads to “a clear break or
discontinuity with the preceding system.” De Filippi & Loveluck, supra note 14, at 11 n.13.
This results in “two blockchain networks featuring two different and incompatible protocols.”
Id. at 8; see also NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 73 (A hard fork is a change to the
protocol that “introduces new features that were previously considered invalid” where some
nodes do not upgrade such that “the old nodes will work on a branch of the block chain that
excludes blocks with the new feature. . . . This type of change is called a ‘hard-forking’
change because it makes the block chain split.”); Eric D. Chason, Cryptocurrency Hard Forks
and Revenue Ruling 2019–24, 39 VA. TAX REV. 277, 281 (2019) (“In technical terms, a hard
fork occurs when some users adopt new software that is inconsistent with past software.”).
Note that hard forks occur all the time. When a developer takes the source code of an opensource project, including a blockchain protocol, and forks it to create an entirely different
project, a hard fork occurs. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 171, 243. Prominent
examples include Namecoin and Litecoin, both hard forks from the Bitcoin blockchain. Id. at
247–49. Such hard forks do not pose any controversy or governance crisis. Rather, they are
an expected and valuable part of open-source software development. When this Article
discusses hard forks, it is primarily concerned with what some call “contentious hard forks,”
wherein the hard fork is a fork of an active blockchain protocol that causes controversy and
uncertainty among that protocol’s community and userbase. Id. at 75, 172–73.
50. Raina S. Haque et al., Blockchain Development and Fiduciary Duty, 2 STAN. J.
BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y 139, 163 (2019) (calling the SegWit update contentious); see also
De Filippi & Loveluck, supra note 14, at 7.
51. DIEDRICH, supra note 13, at 293–99; Reyes et al., supra note 48, at 7 (“The original
Ethereum blockchain continues as ‘Ethereum classic’ with its related ether trading at a vastly
reduced price.”).
52. DIEDRICH, supra note 13, at 289 (“Life stopped. Religious battles ensued behind the
scenes as to whether [to] do nothing about the theft—because Ethereum had not failed, just
the code of The DAO had turned out to be flawed!—And had not the loud and clear
proclamation of the makers of the DAO been that code is law! Well, that law had not been
broken.”).
53. Ehrsam, supra note 45 (describing one of the downsides of hard forks as reducing
trust—“[n]ow that we’ve had a breaking change, those previously referencing the protocol
must now go outside the blockchain and somehow figure out what the ‘right’ new version is
to use”).
54. Aaron van Wirdum, The Birth of BCH: The First Crazy Days of “Bitcoin Cash,”
BITCOIN MAG. (Aug. 2, 2017), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/birth-bch-first-crazydays-bitcoin-cash/ [https://perma.cc/YXM7-VPUL]. Bitcoin is the name used to refer to the
original and dominant Bitcoin blockchain protocol. See Spencer Bogart, Bitcoin vs. Bitcoin
Cash: A Story of Prioritization & Healthy Competition in Money, FORBES (Nov. 13, 2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/spencerbogart/2017/11/13/bitcoin-vs-bitcoin-cash-a-story-ofprioritization-a-healthy-competition-in-money/ [https://perma.cc/73D3-CVZC].
55. Bitcoin Cash is the protocol that sprung into existence after the Bitcoin blockchain
hard fork—it is an “offshoot” of Bitcoin. Bogart, supra note 54.
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to scale the Bitcoin blockchain to better handle the high volume of
transactions requested continues to rage,56 and the gridlock has caused high
transaction fees and excruciatingly slow processing times57—two of the
features that allegedly make the blockchain a better system for the exchange
of value.58 Other proposals to change the core Bitcoin code led to
A cryptocurrency wallet hack60 left
marketplace uncertainty.59
approximately $280 million worth of Ether frozen and unusable, with no
clear path forward for recovery.61 The high level of controversy and the
inability to reach consensus regarding key decisions on infrastructure design,
security threats, and community policing have been described in the literature
as parts of an ongoing governance crisis faced by public blockchain
protocols.62
The governance problems experienced by the Bitcoin and Ethereum
communities stem from conflicts of interest among governance participants.
Generally, the participants in a blockchain protocol ecosystem include core
developers, other open-source code contributors, full node operators,63
56. De Filippi & Loveluck, supra note 14, at 11–12 (describing the debate and the level
of ensuing controversy, often referred to as a “‘civil war’ within the Bitcoin community”).
57. Jonald Fyookball, Why Does Bitcoin Have Ridiculously High Fees and Slow
Confirmations?, MEDIUM (Aug. 30, 2017), https://medium.com/@jonaldfyookball/why-doesbitcoin-have-ridiculously-high-fees-and-slow-confirmations-e3fd58258a6d
[https://perma.cc/LR2C-CFRP].
58. Panos Mourdoukoutas, Could Bitcoin Replace Credit Cards?, FORBES (Aug. 26,
2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/panosmourdoukoutas/2018/08/26/bitcoin-could-replace
-credit-cards/ [https://perma.cc/8N27-7PCK].
59. Alyssa Hertig, Why Are Miners Involved in Bitcoin Code Changes Anyway?,
COINDESK (July 28, 2017), https://www.coindesk.com/miners-involved-bitcoin-codechanges-anyway/ [https://perma.cc/E6HG-4VZD].
60. This was actually the second hack in quick succession. In the first hack, an attacker
stole approximately $30 million worth of Ether by attacking three widely used smart contracts.
Santiago Palladino, The Parity Wallet Hack Explained, OPENZEPPELIN (July 19, 2017),
https://blog.zeppelin.solutions/on-the-parity-wallet-multisig-hack-405a8c12e8f7
[https://perma.cc/YP5N-DKL9].
61. Becky Peterson, Someone Deleted Some Code in a Popular Cryptocurrency Wallet—
and as Much as $280 Million in Ether Is Locked Up, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 7, 2017),
https://www.businessinsider.com/ethereum-parity-wallet-hack-freeze-missing-code-2017-11
[https://perma.cc/DNC6-PPQ8].
62. De Filippi & Loveluck, supra note 14, at 13 (“One thing is sure though: regardless of
the robustness and technical viability of the Bitcoin protocol, this governance crisis and failure
in conflict resolution has highlighted the fragility of the current decision-making mechanisms
within the Bitcoin project.”).
63. This Article uses the term “full node” or “full node operator” to refer to the operators
of nodes in any blockchain protocol who possess the power to validate blocks of transactions
or otherwise approve state changes and adopt software upgrades to the protocol, regardless of
what those nodes are called within the protocol community. For example, in the Bitcoin
blockchain system, fully validating nodes, including miners, but not SPV clients would be
included. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 68–71 (“Validating a block is more complex
than validating transactions. . . . Fully validating nodes must stay permanently connected so
as to hear about all Bitcoin transactions. . . . Such nodes also have to store the entire block
chain . . . . [In contrast,] ‘Simplified Payment Verification’ (SPV) clients . . . don’t store the
entire block chain . . . . SPV nodes can only validate transactions that actually affect them.
So they’re essentially trusting the fully validating nodes to have validated all the other
transactions that are out there.”). This Article’s term “full node” would refer to the same
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holders of cryptocurrency or tokens, protocol founders, and foundations.64
The open-source developers design, create, and submit protocol updates,
fixes, and modifications to the community for consideration.65 Developers
of many blockchain protocols undertake their work for free.66 Meanwhile,
full node operators enjoy the power not only to validate transactions but also
to enact the core developers’ updates and proposals.67 Unlike the developers,
full node operators are motivated by economic gain—the income obtained
from their status as full node operators depends on both the activity of
validating transactions and the receipt of transaction fees from users.68 As a
result, full node operators may have self-interested reasons for making a
particular decision on a core developer proposal.69 For example, although
division of including fully validating nodes but not SPV clients, which, indeed, do not
technically count as nodes insofar as SPV clients are actually tethered to a fully validating
node and are dependent on that fully validating node to actively interact with the network.
StopAndDecrypt, Bitcoin Miners Beware: Invalid Blocks Need Not Apply, HACKER NOON
(June 1, 2018), https://hackernoon.com/bitcoin-miners-beware-invalid-blocks-need-notapply-51c293ee278b
[https://perma.cc/7XHY-V8CZ];
StopAndDecrypt,
Sharding
Centralizes Ethereum by Selling You Scaling-In Disguised as Scaling-Out, HACKER NOON
(May 23, 2018), https://hackernoon.com/sharding-centralizes-ethereum-by-selling-youscaling-in-disguised-as-scaling-out-266c136fc55d
[https://perma.cc/RDL9-CHQQ]
(In
Ethereum 2.0, the term full node might be read to refer to only “a $16,000 node that stakes.”).
In a masternode protocol, the term full node, as used in this Article, would refer to the
masternodes. See, e.g., How Masternodes Work, DASH, https://www.dash.org/masternodes/
[https://perma.cc/6ZN9-PD3E] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020) (“Masternodes host full copies of
the blockchain and provide a unique second layer of services to the network, facilitating
advanced functions such as InstantSend, PrivateSend and usernames on the blockchain. . . .
As highly committed custodians of the project, masternode operators are given the opportunity
to vote each month on up to 10% of the block reward to fund community projects supporting
the Dash ecosystem.”). Other blockchain protocols may use different names for “fully
validating nodes” within their communities, and they may have slightly different
responsibilities. The term “full node” or “full node operator” is intended to be broad enough
to capture these decentralized decision makers, regardless of the name used colloquially by
the community in which they operate. If a community wanted to designate a subset of full
nodes as responsible parties (or exclude them altogether) for one reason or another, they
certainly could customize that in the governance contract.
64. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 173–75.
65. Id. at 171.
66. Benkler, supra note 2, at 372–73 (“Free software projects do not rely either on markets
or on managerial hierarchies to organize production. Programmers do not generally
participate in a project because someone who is their boss instructed them, though some do.
They do not generally participate in a project because someone offers them a price, though
some participants do focus on long-term appropriation through money-oriented activities, like
consulting or service contracts. But the critical mass of participation in projects cannot be
explained by the direct presence of a command, a price, or even a future monetary return,
particularly in the all-important microlevel decisions regarding selection of projects to which
participants contribute.”).
67. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 131, 173; Vlad Zamfir, Blockchain Governance
101, MEDIUM: GOOD AUDIENCE (Sept. 29, 2018), https://blog.goodaudience.com/blockchaingovernance-101-eea5201d7992 [https://perma.cc/3SH7-JPQC] (“[N]ode operators have to
decide what software to run . . . .”).
68. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 117–19 (describing the business model of
mining).
69. Haque et al., supra note 50, at 163 (“Mining is a for-profit industry in which profits
are determined in large part by the cost of computational power to mine in relation to the value
of the cryptocurrency being mined. Therefore, a key factor in a miner’s decision framework
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the most hotly debated topic—scaling the protocols to enable faster
processing and the ability to handle additional transactions—is often debated
in terms of network security, the reality is that an effective scaling solution
may undermine the profits of full node operators by reducing transaction
fees.70 In other words, the only group that can provide the solution may block
it for reasons of pure economic self-interest.
Meanwhile, because the developers, and specifically the core developers,
charged with maintaining and updating the protocol often participate in this
activity for ideological reasons,71 their view of the appropriate protocol
architecture may be removed from the realities, expectations, and needs of
those using the protocol—the cryptocurrency owners.72 Notably, not all
cryptocurrency owners are equally situated.73 Some users are consumers
with a passive interest in their investment,74 others build applications or other
businesses related to their ownership, such as wallet providers and exchange
operators.75 The business holders,76 with larger holdings, may hold a
different view on governance issues than individual and more apathetic
users.77 A protocol founder, or a foundation designed to promote the
protocol or undertake research and advocacy related to the protocol, may
support one position over another in a particularly difficult or highly charged
matter.78
In an attempt to more consciously address these conflicting interests in
their communities, public blockchain protocols generally choose between

(i.e., which version of the software application to run and which history to adopt) is the effect
that a certain proposed code change will have on the value of the cryptocurrency.”).
70. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 130–36 (describing mining incentives and
strategies, including attacks on the protocol for the economic benefit of the miner).
71. Id. at 175–76.
72. Zamfir, supra note 67 (describing core developers’ primary interest in preserving the
quality of their software repositories so that their code is used and preferred above the code
provided by others). Core developers, like open-source software developers more broadly,
predominately engage in a reputation game. Benkler, supra note 2, at 424–25.
73. See Reyes, Rockefeller, supra note 30, at 393–94.
74. Id.
75. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 174 (describing merchants and payment
services).
76. These may include block explorers, exchanges, and application developers, among
others. Zamfir, supra note 67.
77. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 174.
78. Id. at 174–75. The DAO incident evidences some of the conflicts of interest that can
manifest when questions of protocol management arise. The DAO, a decentralized venture
capital firm, operated through computer code on top of the Ethereum protocol. Reyes et al.,
supra note 48, at 4–6. When one of the members of the firm used loopholes in the DAO’s
computer code to siphon off $55 million worth of the DAO’s assets, the event forced the
Ethereum community to make a governance decision: should the underlying Ethereum
protocol be revised to reflect the state of transactions before the DAO’s creation or should the
DAO participants be forced to accept the consequences of their investment gone wrong? The
community eventually chose to revise the protocol via a hard fork, but not without extensive
discussion, maneuvering, and politics among the core developers, miners, and userbase.
Walch, In Code(rs) We Trust, supra note 21, at 60–64.
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two types of governance: “on-chain” and “off-chain.”79 On-chain
governance generally refers to attempts to hard code governance rules into
the consensus mechanism used to confirm transactions conducted on the
protocol.80 Generally speaking, however, on-chain governance mechanisms
are new, experimental, and in very early stages of development.81 Most
governance of the leading public blockchain protocols takes place offchain.82 Off-chain governance refers to the governance processes that take
place outside of the code and are generally used to make decisions about
whether and how to make updates to the core protocol code.83 Off-chain
governance mechanisms have come under increasingly heavy criticism from
both technical and academic experts who that the mechanisms have grown
up in a haphazard way that may not be optimal.84 Even without taking a
position in the debate regarding whether on- or off-chain governance will
work better in the long run,85 public blockchain protocols cannot wait for onchain mechanisms to prove effective. Any on-chain governance mechanism
beyond the consensus mechanism for validating transactions is difficult to
implement.86 If public blockchain protocol communities wait for on-chain
systems to be perfected, they risk imposition of an off-chain governance
mechanism by regulators that does not fit their ethos, purposes, or values.87
When codes of conduct are imposed on open-source software projects from
the outside, the results can be disastrous.88
This is a pivotal moment for blockchain technology. Disagreement about
how blockchain protocol governance should proceed makes protocols
79. Pool of Stake, Revisiting the On-Chain Governance vs. Off-Chain Governance
Discussion, MEDIUM (May 22, 2018), https://medium.com/@poolofstake/revisiting-the-onchain-governance-vs-off-chain-governance-discussion-f68d8c5c606
[https://perma.cc/72MB-JEL6].
80. Id.
81. Brian Curran, What Is Blockchain Governance?: Complete Beginner’s Guide,
BLOCKONOMI
(Sept.
21,
2018),
https://blockonomi.com/blockchain-governance/
[https://perma.cc/78B6-BTB5]; see also Reijers et al., supra note 26, at 1–2.
82. See Reijers et al., supra note 26, at 1–2.
83. Pool of Stake, supra note 79.
84. Curran, supra note 81; Ehrsam, supra note 45; On-Chain Governance, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/onchain-governance.asp
[https://perma.cc/77CMH4B4] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020).
85. See Zamfir, supra note 45 (against on-chain governance); cf. Ehrsam, supra note 45
(in favor of on-chain governance).
86. See, e.g., Learn About Tezos, TEZOS, https://tezos.com/get-started [https://perma.cc/
6699-MLEY] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020); Aaron Stanley, EOS: Unpacking the Big Promises
Behind a Possible Blockchain Contender, COINDESK (June 25, 2017), https://
www.coindesk.com/eos-unpacking-the-big-promises-behind-a-possible-blockchaincontender [https://perma.cc/BM6F-2E6R].
87. See generally Walch, In Code(rs) We Trust, supra note 21 (arguing that core
developers and node operators should shoulder fiduciary duties); Wolfie Zhao, CFTC Official
Warns Smart Contract Designers over Predictive Code, COINDESK (Oct. 17, 2018),
https://www.coindesk.com/cftc-official-warns-smart-contract-designers-over-predictivecode [https://perma.cc/QR2S-9TGP]; Complaint, supra note 22, at 11–12.
88. Linux Developers Threaten to Pull “Kill Switch,” LULZ (Sept. 24, 2018),
https://lulz.com/linux-devs-threaten-killswitch-coc-controversy-1252/
[https://perma.cc/4CK8-LDBC].
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inflexible and slow to adapt89 and, if not resolved, may impact future
adoption.90 Further, the use of hard forks to rescue user funds has led to
claims that core developers must rescue funds when possible or face a class
action lawsuit.91 As a result, the governance crisis now poses a threat not
just to the technical function of blockchain protocols but also to the broader
system of open-source software development.92 Blockchain technology
protocols are not the first open-source protocol to face such governance
problems on a global scale. In fact, the development of blockchain
governance to date traces a very similar path as that of internet governance.
If blockchain governance development does not proceed carefully from this
point, it may fall victim to some of the same perils to which the internet
succumbed.
B. The Path of Internet Governance and Its Perils
Commentators often compare blockchain protocols to the Internet
Protocol.93 Blockchain protocols set the rules that allow computers to
interact with each other regarding the exchange of value on a peer-to-peer
basis, in much the same way the internet sets the rules that allow computers
to exchange information on a peer-to-peer basis.94 Further, many blockchain
protocols, like the internet, are, at launch, “generative: they were designed
to accept any contribution that followed a basic set of rules.”95 Some,
therefore, recommend that blockchain governance follow the path of internet
governance.96 However, even a brief review of the development of current
internet governance mechanisms reveals certain shortcomings that
blockchain protocol governance would do well to avoid.97 In particular,
89. Nick Tomaino, The Governance of Blockchains, MEDIUM (Feb. 28, 2017),
https://thecontrol.co/the-governance-of-blockchains-5ba17a4f5da6
[https://perma.cc/
M8YW-PU3N].
90. Simon Chandler, Why Blockchain Adoption Is Slow, and Why That’s Nothing to Worry
About, CRYPTONEWS (Apr. 15, 2018), https://cryptonews.com/exclusives/why-blockchainadoption-is-slow-and-why-that-s-nothing-to-wo-1577.htm [https://perma.cc/SMQ8-98YS]
(noting that some lack of adoption stems from the scaling problem faced by public
blockchains, which has remained unsolved by off-chain governance of those protocols).
91. Complaint, supra note 22, at 3–4, 24–25.
92. Benkler, supra note 2, at 381–400.
93. Marco Iansiti & Karim R. Lakhani, The Truth About Blockchain, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Jan.–Feb. 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/01/the-truth-about-blockchain [https://perma.cc/
MR6F-LBUM].
94. For definitional clarity on the term “protocol,” see GALLOWAY, supra note 12, at 74–
75.
95. ZITTRAIN, supra note 29, at 3.
96. See generally Hacker, supra note 42 (recommending the creation of an ICANN for
blockchain technology in order to create and implement a universal corporate governance
code).
97. The term “internet governance” holds different meanings and implications for
different people. As a result, many differences of opinion exist regarding precisely which
features of internet governance are strengths and which are weaknesses. The account
presented here represents one such interpretation, well-grounded in the relevant literature, of
internet governance, its history, and its implications for our present experience and future
expectations.
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critics of modern-day internet governance denounce the recentralization of
the internet,98 the lack of institutional legitimacy,99 and the increasing
politicization of internet governance and100 argue that the chosen governance
mechanisms allowed inappropriate intervention by sovereign governments
and the fragmentation of what was intended to be a global, borderless
network.101
Like the definition of blockchain governance, the definition of internet
governance remains contested.102 The United Nations Working Group on
Internet Governance defines internet governance as “the development and
application by Governments, the private sector, and civil society, in their
respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making
98. Milton Mueller, Commentary, ICANN and Internet Regulation, 42 COMM. ACM 41,
43 (1999) (“In short, we have come a long way since the days when the Internet was touted as
a totally decentralized, self-governing system that could simply route around any attempts to
control it. The levers of control have been exposed for all to see, and ICANN’s tumultuous
and fascinating evolution is the best place to watch how an increasingly globalized society
balances the need for open communication with demands for centralized control.”). See
generally ZITTRAIN, supra note 29 (warning against the increasing centralized architecture of
the internet); Félix Tréguer, Gaps and Bumps in the Political History of the Internet, INTERNET
POL’Y REV., Oct. 2017, at 1, 3–4 (describing the scholarship of Jonathan Zittrain, Yochai
Benkler, and Tim Wu as exploring “whether the internet, despite its countless founding
techno-utopias about its subversive and democratic potential, was undergoing the same
process of ‘feudalisation’ as past information technologies, and how law and policy might
help stop that fate”).
99. See, e.g., Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J.
187, 212–17 (2000).
100. GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 29, at 46 (describing the events that led to the issuance
of the U.S. “Green Paper” on internet root control and concluding that “[t]he Green Paper
marked the beginning of a different age of the Internet, one in which powerful governments
would begin to use threats of force to make their wills known”); MILTON L. MUELLER,
NETWORKS AND STATES: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTERNET GOVERNANCE 1 (2010) (“A
distinctive global politics is developing around the Internet. Like global trade and
environmental policy, Internet governance has become a point of international conflict among
states and a target of transnational policy advocates from business and civil society.”).
101. See, e.g., Dmitry Epstein, The Making of Institutions of Information Governance: The
Case of the Internet Governance Forum, 28 J. INFO. TECH. 137, 139 (2013) (“For many in the
Internet community, particularly those belonging to the old guard of Internet designers and
those viewing the Internet in more libertarian terms, the growing interest of governments in
issues of Internet governance, specifically the calls to implement a more nation-state focused
and hierarchical decision-making process, was an assault on the very spirit of the Internet and
its normative foundations.”); see also GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 29, at 181–82 (“The
Internet was supposed to be the test case for self-governing systems that could flourish without
respect to geography and territorially based coercion. It was supposed to allow like-minded
people to join communities and govern themselves without respect to geography, without
regard to the top-down coercive structures of territorial governmental systems, and without
the usual pathologies and corruptions that characterize territorial rule. . . . Our peek below the
surface of eBay’s self-governing façade revealed a far different story—a story of heavy
reliance on the iron fist of coercive governmental power.”).
102. Lee A. Bygrave, Introduction, in INTERNET GOVERNANCE: INFRASTRUCTURE AND
INSTITUTIONS 1, 2 (Lee A. Bygrave & Jon Bing eds., 2009). Or, as one study puts it, “there is
no shortage of available definitions for Internet governance . . . .” ANRI VAN DER SPUY, WHAT
IF WE ALL GOVERNED THE INTERNET?: ADVANCING MULTISTAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN
INTERNET GOVERNANCE 16 (2017), https://en.unesco.org/sites/default/files/what_if_we_
all_governed_internet_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/XKJ9-9C5P].
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procedures and programmes, that shape the evolution and utilization of the
Internet.”103 Variations of this definition abound.104 Arguably, internet
governance encompasses both questions of infrastructure (or architecture)
and questions of content modulation.105 Because commonalities in questions
related to infrastructure governance dominate the parallel between
blockchain protocol governance and internet governance, this Part focuses
on the path of internet infrastructure governance.
The original architects of the internet designed it to be “open, minimalist,
and neutral.”106 Those design principles reflected the ideology of the
internet’s creators107—an ideology that distrusted centralized control and
reflected libertarian ideals.108 That ideology also affected governance
mechanisms for determining whether and how to make design changes;
rather than vote, the architects argued until they reached a rough
consensus.109 Initially, certain individuals exerted a large measure of control
over internet design and architectural decisions.110 Over time, these
103. WORKING GRP. ON INTERNET GOVERNANCE, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
INTERNET GOVERNANCE 4 (2005), https://www.wgig.org/docs/WGIGREPORT.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZFE2-5JR6]. This definition closely models that adopted as the working
definition in the “Tunis Agenda for the Information Society”: “[T]he development and
application by governments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of
shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the
evolution and use of the internet.” GLOB. COMM’N ON INTERNET GOVERNANCE, ONE INTERNET
1 (2016), https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/gcig_final_report_-_with_cover.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H687-YCGF].
104. See, e.g., MILTON MUELLER ET AL., MAKING SENSE OF “INTERNET GOVERNANCE”:
DEFINING PRINCIPLES AND NORMS IN A POLICY CONTEXT 4 (2004) (defining internet
governance as “[c]ollective action, by governments and/or the private sector operators of
TCP/IP networks, to establish rules and procedures to enforce public policies and resolve
disputes that involve multiple jurisdictions” (emphasis omitted)); Marius Kalinauskas &
Mantas Barčys, Interaction Between National Governments and ICANN While Administering
the Internet, 3 SOC. TECHNOLOGIES 432, 435 (2013) (taking the position that the term internet
governance lacks a useful definition but “stands mainly for the global technical management
of the core resources of the Internet: domain names, IP addresses, Internet protocols, and the
root server system”); see also MUELLER, supra note 100, at 8–10 (discussing the evolving
nature of the term “Internet governance”).
105. Bygrave, supra note 102, at 2.
106. GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 29, at 23.
107. ZITTRAIN, supra note 29, at 28 (“The design of the Internet reflected not only the
financial constraints of its creators, but also their motives.”).
108. GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 29, at 23.
109. ZITTRAIN, supra note 29, at 28 (“The network’s design was publicly available and
freely shared from the earliest moments of its development. If designers disagreed over how
a particular protocol should work, they would argue until one had persuaded most of the
interested parties. The motto among them was, ‘We reject: kings, presidents, and voting. We
believe in: rough consensus and running code.’”).
110. Lee A. Bygrave & Terje Michaelsen, Governors of Internet, in INTERNET
GOVERNANCE: INFRASTRUCTURE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 102, at 92, 93 (“The reference
to ‘individual members’ underlines the fact that governance in this first generation has been
exercised under the relatively strong influence of individual persons. These persons have been
able, alone and together, to make their mark over and above the organizations to which they
have been attached. Prominent examples include Jon Postel, Vinton Cerf, and Tim BernersLee.”); see also GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 29, at 22 (“At the same time that John Perry
Barlow and Julian Dibbell were teaching the world about cyberspace self-rule, a crucial group
of non-governmental actors was already exercising extraordinary powers of Net
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individuals ceded their roles to more formal organizations.111 Those
organizations center their efforts on creating, maintaining, and developing
the core protocols for internet communication, guarding the design principles
viewed as key elements of those core protocols, and preserving the ethos of
decision-making that guided the early internet—“rough consensus and
running code.”112 Such organizations include the Internet Society, formed in
1992 with Vinton Cerf leading the charge;113 the World Wide Web
Consortium (“W3C”), established in 1994 by Tim Berners-Lee;114 and the
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, which organically emerged as the
creation of Jon Postel in 1988.115 Other interrelated organizations also
emerged, including the Internet Architecture Board, the Internet Engineering
Task Force, the Internet Engineering Steering Group, and the Internet
Research Task Force, among others.116 Notably, up until the late 1990s, few
of these internet governance organizations maintained close ties to any
national government.117
Then, in 1998, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN) incorporated as a California nonprofit public benefit
corporation.118 ICANN’s formation remains the subject of critique and
controversy.119 ICANN emerged as a solution to a situation viewed as a
governance. . . . They were as native to the Internet as it is possible to be, for these were the
storied ‘founders’ of the Internet itself—men like Larry Roberts, Robert Kahn, Vint Cerf, Jon
Postel, and Dave Clark.”); id. at 29–46 (describing Jon Postel as “the God of the Internet”).
For a deeper dive into the individual founders of the internet and their initial governance roles,
see generally KATIE HAFNER & MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE: THE
ORIGINS OF THE INTERNET (1996).
111. Bygrave & Michaelsen, supra note 110, at 93–103.
112. Id. at 93–94.
113. Id. at 95.
114. Id. at 101. See generally BERNERS-LEE, supra note 7.
115. Bygrave & Michaelsen, supra note 110, at 103.
116. Id. at 96–102; see also Ingo Take, Regulating the Internet Infrastructure: A
Comparative Appraisal of the Legitimacy of ICANN, ITU, and the WSIS, 6 REG. &
GOVERNANCE 499, 504 (2012) (explaining that the International Telecommunication Union
(ITU) is responsible for formulation of technical standards for information and communication
technology while the United Nations World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) aims
to manage the conflict between ITU and ICANN).
117. Bygrave & Michaelsen, supra note 110, at 92 (“All in all, it is a governance structure
reflecting both the Internet itself and its history of development. Concomitantly, the
governance structure is relatively unencumbered by dirigiste ideology. While tentacles of
government control are visible, private sector bodies have usually been permitted—and,
indeed, often encouraged—to play the lead role in design and management of the Internet.”);
see also Take, supra note 116 (describing ITU, ICANN, and WSIS, wherein ICANN, as
further discussed below, is the only organization linked directly to a specific nation).
118. Bygrave & Michaelsen, supra note 110, at 103.
119. See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 98, at 42; Milton L. Mueller & Farzaneh Badiei,
Governing Internet Territory: ICANN, Sovereignty Claims, Property Rights and Country
Code Top-Level Domains, 17 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 435, 449 (2017) (“The newlyformed ICANN viewed itself as carrying on Postel’s legacy as a global governing authority
based on private contracts . . . . But Postel’s halo failed to rub off on ICANN. Incumbent
ccTLD delegees, especially those that were independent of state authority, resisted any
arrangement that would give ICANN (or the local government) the ability to expropriate or
regulate them.”).
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crisis threatening the efficacy of internet governance.120 In the face of
increasing commercial use of the internet, the ad hoc management of the
domain name system that prevailed at the time came under fire from industry,
national governments, and technologists.121 The U.S. Department of
Commerce stepped in, calling for “a new entity to assume the primary
responsibility for the management of internet names and addresses.”122
ICANN’s creation123 solved the riddle of domain name system
management124 and answered the Department of Commerce’s call125 by
formalizing control of the domain name system (DNS).126 Increasingly,
however, commentators critique ICANN for allowing U.S. dominance,127
lacking accountability,128 and lacking transparency.129 These critiques bely
120. FRANCES CAIRNCROSS, THE DEATH OF DISTANCE: HOW THE COMMUNICATIONS
REVOLUTION IS CHANGING OUR LIVES 85 (2001) (“Unlike the IETF, ICANN did not grow
organically from the grassroots up. And unlike W3C, it was not the initiative of a single Web
pioneer. Instead, it was set up in 1998 to end a row over the way the allocation of electronic
addresses was managed.”); Epstein, supra note 101, at 138 (“Thus, at the end of the 1980s and
early 1990s a set of tensions arose between the loose institutions of Internet governance and
the US government. Those tensions centered primarily on the question of authority over the
domain name system (DNS) hierarchy and were fueled by the shift of power balance in favor
of commercial, as opposed to government or educational, interests in the Internet.”).
121. Bygrave & Michaelsen, supra note 110, at 104.
122. Emily M. Weitzenboeck, Hybrid Net: The Regulatory Framework of ICANN and the
DNS, 22 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 49, 51 (2014).
123. For a detailed history of ICANN’s creation, which is beyond the scope of this Article,
see DAVID LINDSAY, INTERNATIONAL DOMAIN NAME LAW: ICANN AND THE UDRP (2007)
and MILTON L. MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT: INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND THE TAMING OF
CYBERSPACE 73–205 (2002).
124. Take, supra note 116, at 504–05 (“As a private organization, ICANN has been charged
with the allocation and administration of domain names since 1998. Furthermore, the mission
of ICANN includes introducing and promoting competition in the registration of domain
names within the generic top-level domain (gTLD)-areas (.com, .org, .net, etc.).”).
125. Weitzenboeck, supra note 122, at 51.
126. Bygrave & Michaelsen, supra note 110, at 103–13.
127. Steve DelBianco & Braden Cox, ICANN Internet Governance: Is It Working?, 21
PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 27, 41 (2008) (describing critiques that the United
States has undue influence over ICANN and the critical internet infrastructure it manages);
see also Bygrave & Michaelsen, supra note 110, at 108, 112 (“One of the main objections to
the ICANN regime has been the central role played by the US government in its
development.”); Konstantinos Komaitis, ICANN: Guilty as Charged?, J. INFO. L. & TECH.,
July 4, 2003, at 1; Weitzenboeck, supra note 122, at 51–52 (describing the origins of the heavy
U.S. influence over ICANN). Notably, in 2014, amidst mounting criticism of its
overinvolvement, the United States announced that it would terminate its control of the root
and turn over ICANN control to the “global multistakeholder community.” Mueller & Badiei,
supra note 119, at 465. The transition occurred on October 1, 2016. Id.
128. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 101, at 138 (“The still ongoing debate over the shape of
the governance system of the Internet is to a great extent a debate over the shape of the network
itself. . . . It is a debate over legitimacy of decision-making processes and institutions
concerned with the Internet.”). But see generally Bygrave & Michaelsen, supra note 110, at
111 (“ICANN has been accused of . . . failing to give civil society groups adequate
representation in its policy development.”); C. N. J. de Vey Mestdagh & R. W. Rijgersberg,
Rethinking Accountability in Cyberspace: A New Perspective on ICANN, 21 INT’L REV. L.
COMPUTERS & TECH. 27 (2007) (arguing that these critiques may be misdirected).
129. Bygrave & Michaelsen, supra note 110, at 111 (“Another category of criticism
concerns ICANN’s modus operandi. ICANN has been accused of opaque, slow, and arbitrary
decision making—particularly with regard to the issue of root extension . . . .”); Take, supra
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a broader concern regarding widespread interference of national
governments in the further design of the internet.130 As governments use
their coercive power,131 they begin to “establish different visions of what the
Internet might be. In so doing, they will attract other nations to choose
among models of control . . . . The result is the beginning of a technological
version of the cold war, with each side pushing its own vision of the Internet’s
future.”132 This history of internet governance and its perils holds important
lessons for the future of blockchain protocol governance.
II. THE PROMISE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Having reviewed the history of off-chain governance in the blockchain
technology context and the tumultuous history of internet governance, this
Part considers the parallels between the two. Concluding that the internet
governance experience offers a prophetic picture of future blockchain
protocol governance absent some structured intervention, this Part explores
the functional equivalency shared by blockchain protocols and corporations.
Finding functional equivalency in key areas and recognizing the shared
governance problem as one of managing conflicts of interest between owners
and managers, this Part points to the promise of corporate governance
paradigms as models for contractual solutions to the blockchain governance
crisis.
A. Blockchain Technology’s Governance Path Mirrors That of the Internet
The parallel between the development of the internet and the development
of blockchain protocols is clear.133 Both technologies are protocol
technologies.134 Both technologies were released in what has been described
as a nascent or underdeveloped stage.135 Both technologies enable peer-to-

note 116, at 507 (“[O]thers criticize the insufficient coordination of information flows and the
weakly institutionalized cooperation with members and external stakeholders.”); see also
MUELLER, supra note 100, at 248 (“ICANN as it currently functions is a parody of a bottomup consensus-building governance institution; the only real accountability comes from the
nuclear option of an alternative root system.”).
130. See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 29, at 179–84; Mueller & Badiei, supra note
119, at 484 (“Pure sovereignty would also pose greater risks for the global compatibility of
the DNS.”).
131. Milton Mueller and Farzaneh Badiei detail the efforts of states to claim sovereignty
over country-code top-level domain (ccTLD) delegations: “Have states nevertheless
succeeded in exploiting the isomorphism between the ISO-3166 codes and political geography
to successfully assert more authority over ccTLD delegations than they originally had? Yes,
and their agenda was strongly aided by the preeminent position of one sovereign, the United
States, in the ICANN regime.” Mueller & Badiei, supra note 119, at 489.
132. GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 29, at 184.
133. See Iansiti & Lakhani, supra note 93.
134. Daniel Folkinshteyn et al., A Tale of Twin Tech: Bitcoin and the WWW, 10 J.
STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. 82, 84 (2015) (using the term “protocol” to describe both the internet
and the Bitcoin blockchain).
135. Id. at 86 (referring to the internet as a “nascent technology”); Iansiti & Lakhani, supra
note 93 (asking if “blockchain [is] decades from reaching its full potential”).
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peer exchange.136 Both technologies embed libertarian values into the
code.137 Neither technology is controlled by a single actor.138 Early
governance of both technologies sits atop an ethos of “rough consensus and
running code”139 and the dominating influence of certain key individuals.140
Those early, ad hoc elements of governance141 gave way to formalized
governance organizations over time.142 And each suffered a governance
crisis relating to the ability to make important architectural decisions.143
Public blockchain protocols currently sit at such an early stage of
development; however, no governance solutions have been fully
implemented.144 The internet, on the other hand, is far past that. The results
of internet governance efforts to date have been mixed, with many critics
pointing out the perils of national government interference, recentralization,
and increasing politicization as ways that internet governance structures fail
to uphold the original vision of the internet.145 Ultimately, Professor
Jonathan Zittrain warns that, as a result of the current system,
136. Folkinshteyn et al., supra note 134, at 85 (“Just like the World Wide Web, which
allowed for decentralized, permissionless participation and innovation in the information
space, the Bitcoin system allowed for the same in the currency space.” (citation omitted)).
137. See Jack Filiba, Blockchain Is the Internet’s Legacy Through the Internet of Value,
COINSQUARE (Dec. 14, 2017), https://news.coinsquare.com/blockchain/blockchain-internetof-value/ [https://perma.cc/ZWD6-YNVT] (explaining that blockchain technology holds the
potential to realize John Perry Barlow’s “cyber-libertarian” vision for the internet).
138. See Take, supra note 116, at 504; Iansiti & Lakhani, supra note 93 (“A team of
volunteers around the world maintains the core [Bitcoin Blockchain] software.”).
139. ZITTRAIN, supra note 29, at 28; see also Epstein, supra note 101, at 137; Taylor
Pearson, The Downside of Democracy (and What It Means for Blockchain Governance),
COINDESK (June 22, 2018, 8:58 AM), https://www.coindesk.com/downside-democracymeans-blockchain-governance/ [https://perma.cc/NH2S-79C2].
140. Folkinshteyn et al., supra note 134, at 82–84 (comparing the role of Tim Berners-Lee
in forming the W3C to that of Satoshi Nakamoto in forming the Bitcoin blockchain).
141. Epstein, supra note 101, at 137 (“The governance structures informally developed
during the design of the Internet supported substantially different mechanisms of policy
deliberation and decision-making, compared with traditional, formal state-centric
structures.”); Pearson, supra note 139 (describing governance of public blockchain protocols
as quintessentially open-source governance).
142. Bygrave & Michaelsen, supra note 110, at 93–103 (describing how the individual
founders of key pieces of internet infrastructure ceded their roles to organizations); see also
Folkinshteyn et al., supra note 134, at 86 (describing the rise of a standards body that maintains
the Bitcoin blockchain protocol).
143. Lawrence B. Solum, Models of Internet Governance, in INTERNET GOVERNANCE:
INFRASTRUCTURE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 102, at 48, 59–60 (describing the internet
governance crisis suffered when governance of DNS by one individual, Jon Postel, could not
be scaled to meet demand, leading to the creation of ICANN); see also De Filippi & Loveluck,
supra note 14, at 18–19 (describing Bitcoin’s own governance crisis around the issue of
scaling).
144. Notably, some internet governance institutions seem to be attempting to bring
blockchain governance within their domain already, including the United Nations Internet
Governance Forum and W3C, among others. See, e.g., Dynamic Coalition on Blockchain
Technologies (DC-Blockchain), INTERNET GOVERNANCE F., https://intgovforum.org/
multilingual/content/dynamic-coalition-on-blockchain-technologies-dc-blockchain
[https://perma.cc/2WNH-XST5] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020). See generally Blockchain
Community Group, W3C COMMUNITY & BUS. GROUPS, https://www.w3.org/community/
blockchain/ [https://perma.cc/8GD8-DACY] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020).
145. See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text.
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the pieces are in place for a wholesale shift away from the original chaotic
design [of the internet] that has given rise to the modern information
revolution. This counterrevolution would push mainstream users away
from a generative Internet that fosters innovation and disruption, to an
appliancized network that incorporates some of the most powerful features
of today’s Internet while greatly limiting its innovative capacity—and, for
better or worse, heightening its regulability.146

Blockchain communities already express concern about this eventuality
for blockchain technology.147 In a series of blog posts, Ethereum protocol
researcher Vlad Zamfir outlined several potential paths blockchain
governance might take, including: autonomous blockchains (those with fully
on-chain governance); capture of blockchain governance by a corporation,
by government, by the core developers, or by a cartel of participants;
governance via public international law; or governance via international
private cooperation.148 Zamfir warns that autonomous blockchains pose a
threat to their public userbases.149 Zamfir also advocates for blockchain
governance that avoids capture by one or more actors out of fear that
blockchains will then merely serve “a narrow group of stakeholders who are
served by the governance of the capturing entity.”150 Indeed, as a protocol
technology, blockchain technology suffers the same susceptibility to
command and control hierarchies as the internet.151 A protocol is “a set of
instructions for the compilation and interaction of objects.”152 As a result, it
represents the outcome of a careful negotiation that determines which
information flows subordinate to others—the protocol itself is a form of
dominance and hegemony.153 The power of that hegemony can be applied
for the betterment or to the detriment of the individuals using the network
governed by the protocol. Good governance represents the key to ensuring
that the protocol’s power works to society’s benefit and not to its detriment.
If blockchain protocol governance follows the same path as the internet,
the very qualities of blockchain technologies that spur innovation and

146. ZITTRAIN, supra note 29, at 8.
147. Zamfir, supra note 67; Vlad Zamfir, My Intentions for Blockchain Governance,
MEDIUM (Oct. 4, 2018), https://medium.com/@Vlad_Zamfir/my-intentions-for-blockchaingovernance-801d19d378e5 [https://perma.cc/7R3K-VPLW]; see also CleanApp, Blockchain
Governance 102: Response to Vlad Zamfir’s Blockchain Governance 101, MEDIUM (Oct. 2,
2018),
https://medium.com/cryptolawreview/blockchain-governance-102-9912a88da91d
[https://perma.cc/7YX8-JS3F].
148. Zamfir, supra note 67.
149. Zamfir, supra note 147 (“I’m certain that autonomous blockchains will be inevitably
weaponized, and I’m also sure that it is our responsibility to do what we can to prevent people
from attacking innocent bystanders using our software as a weapon. At an absolute
minimum.”).
150. Id.
151. GALLOWAY, supra note 12, at 13 (“While protocol may be more democratic than the
panopticon in that it strives to eliminate hierarchy, it is still very much structured around
command and control and therefore has spawned counter-protocological forces.”).
152. Id. at 75.
153. Id.
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promise disruption may be quashed before they ever fully develop.154
Current proposals to prevent that outcome purport to impose fiduciary duties
on open-source software developers unilaterally, without an obvious
distinction between developers in the blockchain context and the open-source
movement more broadly.155 Such proposals156 threaten the very important
source of innovation society finds in the open-source software movement.
The key to moving forward lies in finding a governance model nimble
enough to be “hacked”—modified and customized to reflect endogenous
priorities and values157—while also remaining readily recognizable to legal
structures in order to prevent certain unhelpful forms of capture. Herein lies
the promise of using a corporate governance model to privately order
blockchain governance by contract.158
B. Corporate Governance as Blockchain Governance
In light of the difficult blockchain governance experience to date and the
perils currently faced as a result of internet governance failures, why turn to
corporate governance paradigms to inform a model for governance of public
blockchains? While other rationales exist,159 this Article considers five key
reasons for turning to a corporate governance model for blockchains. First,
this Article argues not that corporate laws should apply but that formal
governance contracts should be adopted that use corporate governance
structures as inspiration. The idea is to use existing contract law, known for
flexibility and respect for parties’ informed choices, to create governance
154. To that end, I neither favor Zamfir’s outcomes of governance via international law nor
the version of governance by international private ordering presented in his blog post
(governance via ICANN, the Internet Governance Forum, W3C, etc.). See Zamfir, supra note
67. International law is notoriously slow to function and frequently fails to mediate disputes
in ways that prevent national governments from taking further action. Thus, government
capture remains a strong possibility in the international governance scenario or in any version
of international private ordering that relies on the actions of international institutions. See, e.g.,
Carla L. Reyes, Comment, International Governance of Domestic National Security
Measures: The Forgotten Role of the World Trade Organization, 14 UCLA J. INT’L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 531, 557–59 (2009) (detailing the International Court of Justice’s inability to
enforce international law during the Nicaraguan conflict). Instead, this Article argues for true
international private ordering based in contract, so it can be flexible and more nimble than
international governance. This Article further urges blockchain protocol communities to
consider using certain existing corporate governance paradigms because they boast a history
of use, trial and error, and a large body of related theoretical and jurisprudential research.
155. See generally Walch, Call Blockchain Developers What They Are, supra note 21.
156. Note that such proposals can be viewed as a form of the government capture that
Zamfir seeks to avoid. See Zamfir, supra note 67; Zamfir, supra note 147.
157. Elizabeth Pollman, The Rise of Regulatory Affairs in Innovative Startups 6 (Loyola
Law Sch., L.A. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2016-43, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2880818 [https://perma.cc/GVN4-F3BR] (“In reality, hacking
just means building something quickly or testing the boundaries of what can be done.”
(quoting Facebook, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 69 (Feb. 1, 2012) (letter from
Mark Zuckerberg))).
158. Fundamentally, this Article’s proposal is a form of international private cooperation;
it is simply a different form than that initially envisioned by Zamfir. See Zamfir, supra note
67.
159. See generally Hacker, supra note 42.
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regimes that assign roles, responsibilities, and liabilities in ways chosen and
agreed to by the members of each specific blockchain protocol community.
This allows a “hackable”160 model of blockchain governance—resting in
contract, it can push the bounds of what currently exists and can be modified
and customized to fit the community’s needs, values, and priorities.161 That
these contracts use corporate governance for design inspiration represents
only one potential model, but one which is rooted in the history and discourse
of blockchain technology specifically and open-source software
development more broadly. Indeed, the second reason to consider a
corporate governance model rests on the nature and purpose of corporations
and the way the blockchain community often describes the nature and
purpose of blockchain protocols, which reveals blockchain technology as the
functional equivalent162 of a corporation.163 Third, the corporate governance
model is one regularly adopted by the most robust open-source software
development projects, including Linux and Apache.164 Fourth, some
protocols may be developed as freestanding legal entities.165 Whether
organized as a partnership,166 business trust,167 zero-member LLC,168 or
some other entity enabled by new state legislation,169 such organizations
assume certain rights and responsibilities, including certain expectations for
160. “[H]acking just means building something quickly or testing the boundaries of what
can be done.” Pollman, supra note 157, at 6 (quoting Facebook, Inc., Registration Statement
(Form S-1) 69 (Feb. 1, 2012) (letter from Mark Zuckerberg)).
161. In other words, this Article envisions a form of blockchain governance that leverages
contract law to build personalized governance systems for each community. Doing so may
enable new lines of investigation into personalized law. See generally Caryn Devins et al., The
Law and Big Data, 27 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 357 (2017); Philipp Hacker, Personalizing
EU Private Law: From Disclosures to Nudges and Mandates, 25 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 651
(2017).
162. A functional equivalent, as discussed in comparative legal methodology, is another
institution, “legal or non-legal, that perform[s] the same function” as the institution under
study (here, a corporation) in order to address the same societal problem differently. Reyes,
Conceptualizing Cryptolaw, supra note 30, at 416.
163. Reyes, Rockefeller, supra note 30, at 404–05.
164. See generally RITVO ET AL., supra note 40; George Dafermos, Authority in Peer
Production: The Emergence of Governance in the FreeBSD Project, in THE BOOK OF PEER
PRODUCTION 23 (Johan Söderberg & Maxigas eds., 2014); Fish et al., supra note 40.
165. For a discussion on the potential to organize blockchain-based businesses as business
trusts, see generally Reyes, Rockefeller, supra note 30. For a discussion on the potential for
using blockchain-based businesses to create zero-member LLCs, see Shawn Bayern, Of
Bitcoins, Independently Wealthy Software, and the Zero-Member LLC, 108 NW. U. L. REV.
ONLINE 257, 267–70 (2014) [hereinafter Bayern, Of Bitcoins] and Shawn Bayern, The
Implications of Modern Business-Entity Law for the Regulation of Autonomous Systems, 19
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 93 (2015) [hereinafter Bayern, Business-Entity Law for Autonomous
Systems].
166. See generally Dirk A. Zetzsche, Ross P. Buckley & Douglas W. Arner, The
Distributed Liability of Distributed Ledgers: Legal Risks of Blockchain, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV.
1361 (arguing that joint control of distributed ledgers leads to joint liability, as in a
partnership).
167. See generally Reyes, Rockefeller, supra note 30.
168. See generally Bayern, Of Bitcoins, supra note 165; Bayern, Business-Entity Law for
Autonomous Systems, supra note 165.
169. Landen, supra note 38.
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governance.170 Fifth, corporations have a history of governance crises and
an ever-evolving governance paradigm to navigate those crises can be found
in corporate governance rules.171 In other words, blockchain protocols
operate as organizations and offer “a new ‘institutional governance
technology of decentralization.’”172
Effectively, as developers build these new institutions, they functionally
adopt corporate models and transplant corporate law into the code,173 making
corporate governance rules a natural fit for an off-chain governance model.
If we view a blockchain protocol, metaphorically or otherwise, as the very
organizational life of a business, we can explore the ways that the protocol
community might apply corporate governance concepts to the process of
making off-chain decisions about the creation and maintenance of the code
base. Exploring the usefulness of corporate governance models for public
blockchain governance begins with an inquiry into the basic legal
characteristics of corporations. Leading commentators recognize that
endowing corporations with five key characteristics—legal personality,
limited liability, transferable shares, delegated management, and investor
ownership—represents the “principal function of corporate law.”174 First,
the law recognizes a corporation as a separate legal person to enable entity
shielding—namely, separating business assets from those of individual
owners to enable creditor priority and liquidation protection.175 Second,
corporate law provides business owners, the shareholders,176 limited liability
such that business creditors cannot make claims against owners’ personal
assets, while at the same time protecting business assets from claims of

170. Note that when a blockchain protocol incorporates or otherwise forms another legally
recognizable business entity, the law of the jurisdiction of formation may supply certain
contractual default terms relevant to governance. This may or may not be beneficial to the
community.
171. WILLIAM O. FISHER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: OVERVIEW, CASE STUDIES, AND
REFORMS 1 (2017) (describing how corporate governance laws were historically enacted
following corporate governance crises); Brian R. Cheffins, The History of Corporate
Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 46, 46 (Mike Wright
et al. eds., 2013) (“Corporate governance has been with us since the use of the corporate form
created the possibility of conflict between investors and managers.”).
172. Ying-Ying Hsieh, Jean-Philippe Vergne & Sha Wang, The Internal and External
Governance of Blockchain-Based Organizations: Evidence from Cryptocurrencies, in
BITCOIN & BEYOND: CRYPTOCURRENCIES, BLOCKCHAINS, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 48, 48
(Malcolm Campbell-Verduyn ed., 2018) (quoting Trent J. MacDonald et al., Blockchains and
the Boundaries of Self-Organized Economies: Predictions for the Future of Banking 5 (Mar.
18, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2749514 [https://perma.cc/RVB4-M4UK]).
173. See generally Reyes, Conceptualizing Cryptolaw, supra note 30.
174. John Armour et al., What Is Corporate Law?, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW:
A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 1, 1 (3d ed. 2017).
175. Id. at 5–7. “Liquidation protection restricts the ability of both firm owners and their
personal creditors to force the payout of an owner’s share of the firm’s net assets.” Henry
Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 1335, 1338 (2006).
176. Or business trust certificate holders, LLC members, or limited partners.
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owners’ personal creditors.177 Third, fully transferable shares enable
uninterrupted, perpetual existence of the business without regard to
ownership changes over time.178 Fourth, corporate management generally
follows a delegated structure under which the owners elect directors who
hold core management authority, but who then (often) elect separate officers
to address day-to-day operational issues.179 Fifth, and finally, owners of the
corporation invest in the business and receive in return a right to a (limited)
measure of business control and net earnings proportional to that
investment.180
With the exception of legal personality, public blockchain protocols
endogenously fulfill these core functions of corporations. First, with regard
to actors operating entirely on-chain, the protocol code itself acts as “a selfenforcing contract that credibly binds and segregates assets.”181 Therefore,
a blockchain protocol “has the potential to solve the problems of assetpartitioning and limited liability by means of contract alone.”182 Second,
cryptocurrency is fully transferable, enabling the same type of ownership
Further, whether specific
diversification seen in corporations.183
cryptocurrency owners maintain their ownership or relinquish it is of little
import; the protocol continues to function without regard to individual
entrances or exits of owners.184 Third, management of protocols reflects a
similar delegated authority structure to that of corporations. The full node
operators185 retain core managerial decision-making capacity (like a board of
directors), but the day-to-day operational decisions about proposed code
changes reside with a network of open-source software developers, including
the core developers (like employees).186 As noted above, much is made of
the core developers, but core developers do not act alone.187 Rather, any
interested community member can make a code change proposal through the
designated process—in Bitcoin, the Bitcoin Improvement Proposal (BIP),
and in Ethereum, the Ethereum Improvement Proposal (EIP).188

177. Armour et al., supra note 174, at 8–9. “The truly essential aspect of asset partitioning
is, in effect, the reverse of limited liability—namely, the shielding of the assets of the entity
from claims of the creditors of the entity’s owners or managers.” Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE. L.J. 387, 390 (2000).
178. Armour et al., supra note 174, at 10–11. This can be true of business trusts also, but
it is more difficult to achieve in an LLC or partnership context.
179. Id. at 12–13. The same happens in business trusts.
180. Id. at 13. This is the same in business trusts.
181. Usha R. Rodrigues, Law and the Blockchain, 104 IOWA L. REV. 679, 692 (2019).
182. Id.
183. See generally Reyes, Rockefeller, supra note 30.
184. Id.
185. Note that a variety of “nodes” exist. Some nodes are passive users simply interacting
with the protocol directly, rather than through a user interface offered by a third party. Others
actively contribute to the protocol consensus mechanism. De Filippi & Loveluck, supra note
14, at 10. This Article uses the terms “full nodes” and “full node operators” to refer to those
nodes that are active participants in the management of the protocol.
186. See Haque et al., supra note 50, at 152.
187. See id. at 159–162.
188. See id. at 160, 166; see also NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 73–75.

1902

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

However, some blockchain protocols differ from corporations in two
significant respects.
First, when cryptocurrency owners purchase
cryptocurrency, some do so for the purpose of making an investment in the
protocol for which they will receive a proportionate measure of profit or loss.
But not all cryptocurrency holders purchase cryptocurrency for such
speculative investment purposes.189 Rather than reducing the conflicts of
interest posed by the separation ownership from control of the enterprise,
however, this diversity of “owners” likely heightens conflict of interest
concerns. Second, depending upon the consensus mechanism employed by
the protocol, cryptocurrency owners do not vote on who should occupy the
position of full node operator. Arguably, this exacerbates the conflicts of
interest already present in the delegated management structure, as ownership
is even further separated from control than in the context of a traditional
corporation. Notably, this is often not true of decentralized autonomous
organizations operating on top of blockchain protocols, which can reduce the
gap between ownership and control, often devolving control back to the
owners.190 It is also possible that different consensus mechanisms may allow
a devolution of control back to the owners of public blockchains. For
example, a proof of stake consensus mechanism, as used in Dash and as
contemplated by Ethereum’s Casper, enables consensus by vote of the token
owners.191 All of this remains ripe for further investigation and points toward
the importance of preserving blockchain governance mechanisms that can be
shaped to reflect the peculiarities of each protocol.
Overall, blockchain protocols and the corporation exhibit a functional
equivalence that extends to many of the governance difficulties each type of
organization faces. In the corporate context, corporate governance provides
the protocol by which the individual actors that make up the corporate entity
establish the corporate purpose and the means by which they can pursue that
purpose.192 In other words corporate governance “consists of the
institutional structures, legal rules, and best practices that determine which
body within the corporation is empowered to make particular decisions, how
the members of that body are chosen, and the norms that should guide
decision making.”193 Corporate governance mechanisms derive from many
sources, including the law.194 The legal rules that inform corporate
governance work fill the gaps left by the principal-agent tension inherent in

189. See Reyes, Rockefeller, supra note 30, at 393.
190. For further consideration of such entities, see generally Carla L. Reyes, Autonomous
Business Reality (Jan. 10, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
191. Id.; see also De Filippi & Loveluck, supra note 14, at 9, 12 (noting that Bitcoin Classic
“plans to set up a specific governance structure that is intended to promote more democratic
decision-making with regard to code changes, by means of a voting process that will account
for the opinions of the broader community of miners, users, and developers”).
192. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 2
(2012).
193. Id.
194. Id.
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diffuse shareholder ownership that relies on a core group of directors to
manage corporate activity.195
Blockchain protocols resemble corporate organizations with a separation
between ownership and control.196 The owners of the value that powers the
blockchain ecosystem are the cryptocurrency owners, most of whom have no
control or decision-making power regarding the blockchain protocol.197
Instead, full node operators choose when to adopt updates to the protocol,
even though failure of the protocol or mistakes in its development will impact
the value of the cryptocurrency.198 As with corporations, this separation
between ownership and control is a feature of blockchain protocols, not a
bug.199 Few cryptocurrency owners desire to run a full node; they would
rather be passive participants in the ecosystem. Like the corporation,
however, this separation between ownership and control can lead to a
divergence in managerial and owner interests.200
A vivid debate regarding the nature and appropriate response to the
conflicts of interest created by the corporate form persists in the literature.201
A complete review of that debate is beyond the scope of this Article.202
Nevertheless, irrespective of the position in the debate, scholars often agree
that corporate governance rules work to address certain asymmetries in
economic incentives and information availability within the corporation.203
In other words, the function of corporate governance, regardless of the strand
of literature ascribed to, centers on allowing a group of people to coordinate
economic activity in pursuit of profit in the most efficient way possible by

195. Id. at 2–3.
196. Again, note that this is not necessarily true of decentralized autonomous organizations
and/or smart contracts operating on top of the blockchain protocol, and the degree of
separation between ownership and control may vary by consensus mechanism (just as it varies
between public and private corporations). See supra notes 188–89 and accompanying text.
197. Reyes, Rockefeller, supra note 30, at 425.
198. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 73–75 (describing the technical requirements
for changing the Bitcoin blockchain).
199. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 192, at 3.
200. Id.
201. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 547 (2003) (“Since Ronald Coase’s famous article The
Nature of the Firm appeared over six decades ago, both economists and legal scholars have
devoted considerable attention to the theory of the firm. Over time, this body of work
generated a substantial literature providing both positive and normative insights into, inter
alia, the internal governance institutions of firms.” (footnotes omitted)). As is evident by my
inclusion of the principal-agent and team production models, I have considered the scope of
the relevant literature broadly to include both corporate law literature and law and economics
literature.
202. For more in-depth review of the totality of the debate in the literature, see, for example,
Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 31, at 586–96.
203. ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS 286 (1977) (“The internalizing of [the many transactions and processes
involved in making and selling a line of products] reduced transaction and information
costs.”).
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reducing the number and severity of conflicting interests among corporate
actors.204
For example, those adhering to the “principal-agent” model point out the
need to reduce agency costs by restraining management’s action to the
confines of shareholders’ interests.205 The “team production” approach, on
the other hand, explains corporate law as the mediator among unrelated
persons attempting to coordinate productive effort for a profit.206 In this
conception, corporate law mediates attempts to shirk responsibility for the
team’s production and provides disincentives for those who waste resources
by arguing over profit allocation from the team’s work.207 A third model
views the firm as a nexus of contracts.208 In this view, the firm reduces
transaction costs and resolves incomplete contracts by acting as a centralized
contracting party that can unilaterally alter the terms of the contracts
constituting the firm by fiat.209 Other theories of the nature and purpose of
business organizations abound.210 The asymmetries addressed by each of
these various theories of the firm result from: the lack of transparency
regarding the actions of significant numbers of actors, some of whom are
unknown to each other;211 the inability of the parties to sufficiently contract

204. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1737 (2001) (“Contemporary legal
scholarship generally assumes that shareholders, creditors, managers, and employees
cooperate with each other because the market and the law give them incentives to do so. In
accord with conventional economic analysis, these parties are presumed to be rational actors
concerned only with maximizing their own gains. Thus, the primary factors thought to
discourage corporate participants from stealing, shirking their duties, or otherwise mistreating
each other are market incentives and legal rules, including contract rules.”).
205. Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law
and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 769 (2017) (“Agency costs result from the
separation of control and ownership that occurs when managers run a firm but must share its
profits with equity holders. Such managers face incentives to expend less effort and consume
more perquisites than they would if they were the firm’s sole owners. By shirking their duties
and diverting value, managers generate agency costs, which reduce their firm’s value. Many
scholars—we refer to them as agency-cost essentialists—treat the reduction of agency costs
as the essential function of corporate law and related fields such as securities regulation.”
(footnotes omitted)).
206. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,
85 VA. L. REV. 247, 249 (1999).
207. Id. at 249–51.
208. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989); Thomas S. Ulen, The Coasean Firm in Law and Economics, 18
J. CORP. L. 301, 318–28 (1993).
209. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 192, at 555–56.
210. A complete review of all theories of the nature and purpose of the corporation is
beyond the scope of this Article. Others include viewing a corporation as an entity, an
aggregate of natural persons, the property of its shareholders, and a political system or
“franchise government.” Lynn Stout, The Economic Nature of the Corporation, in 2 THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 337, 343
(Francesco Parisi ed., 2017).
211. Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEO. MASON U. L.
REV. 99, 103 (1989) (“The emergence of firm organization, as well as the particular
organizational structure adopted, has been explained as an effort to solve the shirkingmonitoring problem of joint production.”).
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for all variables that will arise over the course of a long-term economic
relationship;212 the rational apathy of shareholders which leads them to
accept information asymmetries;213 and the cost of overcoming these
collective action problems.214
Blockchain protocol governance reflects many of these same conflicts of
interest for many of the same reasons. For instance, when it comes to
resolving contracting inefficiencies in the context of long-term relationships,
corporate law, together with contract law, usually relies on the gap-filling
function of law.215 When viewed in the context of the entire ecosystem that
enables them to operate, blockchain protocols also suffer from gaps—
namely, they require further decisions regarding software maintenance and
updates in order to accommodate the activities of external actors on the
network.216 Protocols generally rely on their off-chain governance processes
to fill those gaps.217 Corporations do the same thing with governance
mechanisms built on top of legal gap-fillers from corporate law.218 This
suggests that corporate governance models may enable a more endogenous
governance model for blockchains than other legal regimes that governments
might seek to impose in the absence of any clearly identifiable system. If
public blockchain protocols and their creators hope to retain the
decentralization of their ecosystems without eventually being forced to
succumb to an ill-fitting regime imposed from the outside, participants in
public blockchain ecosystems should consider voluntarily adopting a
contractual governance mechanism inspired by corporate governance but
tailored to the values, goals, and ethos of their community.219
The proposal offered in this Article helps blockchain governance guard
against each of the four forms of capture that Zamfir outlines as harmful
potential future visions of blockchain governance.220 By creating a voluntary
operating agreement for blockchain protocols, every participant retains
individual agency in blockchain governance, rather than being captured by a
single corporation. By modeling the contract on corporate governance
structures, blockchain communities may combat the persistent perception

212. Blair & Stout, supra note 206, at 259 (“A second interesting organizational problem
arises when parties deal with each other over the course of a long-term productive relationship.
Writing ‘complete’ contracts that explicitly provide for all contingencies can often be costly
or even impossible.”).
213. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 192, at 558.
214. KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 68–69 (1974).
215. Rodrigues, supra note 181, at 687.
216. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 170–75.
217. See De Filippi & Loveluck, supra note 14, at 8.
218. Oliver E. Williamson, The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice
to Contract, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 171, 191 (2002). See generally Rodrigues, supra note 181.
219. That blockchain protocol communities voluntarily adopt such governance
mechanisms is also important from a policy perspective. Efforts by outsiders to impose
controls focused on an intended outcome will invariably have unintended effects because the
participants in the firm (here, the blockchain protocol ecosystem) “are not passive control
agents.” Williamson, supra note 218, at 174.
220. See generally Zamfir, supra note 67.
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that blockchain protocols are a “Wild West” in need of further regulation.221
Delineating the role of core developers via contract will enable blockchain
communities to limit their role and offer a transparent and concrete source of
legitimacy for blockchain governance. Finally, corporate governance itself
seeks to limit a cartel of participants in the corporation from hijacking the
enterprise for ends other than those in the best interests of the shareholders.222
A contractual governance mechanism modeled after corporate governance
will guard against cartel capture in the blockchain context as well. In the
world of actual corporate governance, however, mandatory rules imposed as
part of the incorporation process would impede flexibility.223 Thus, this
proposal, styled (un)corporate crypto-governance, might best be thought of
as most closely aligning with the Delaware approach to statutory business
trusts. The point is to combine the elements of governance used for corporate
forms (defined broadly)224 with those that most closely approximate the
functions of blockchain governance to guard against conflicts of interest,
maintain community legitimacy, and provide an alternative to ill-fitting laws
that governments might consider imposing unilaterally.
III. (UN)CORPORATE CRYPTO-GOVERNANCE
Under a widely, although not universally,225 accepted definition of the
concept, corporate governance “refers to the structure of rights and
responsibilities of the different stakeholders and its consequences for the
process by which companies are controlled and operated.”226 One of the key
issues for corporate governance is ensuring that “executives respect the rights
and interests of company stakeholders, as well as guaranteeing that
stakeholders act responsibly with regard to the generation, protection, and
distribution of wealth invested in the firm.”227 In light of the conflicts of
interest that can plague blockchain governance with very similar types of
assets at stake, the corporate governance laws that constrain this principal-

221. Note that activity conducted via blockchain, just like activity conducted via the
internet, is already heavily regulated. See Carla L. Reyes, Moving Beyond Bitcoin to an
Endogenous Theory of Decentralized Ledger Technology Regulation: An Initial Proposal, 61
VILL. L. REV. 191, 202–11 (2016) (detailing the complex regulatory scheme applicable to
activity conducted via blockchain technology). This Article does not intend to suggest that
contractual governance of blockchain protocols will replace such regulation. All existing laws
would, of course, continue to apply to activity conducted via blockchain technology. Rather,
this proposal relates solely to governing how the community manages the protocol while
mitigating conflicts of interest.
222. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 204, at 1769.
223. Hansmann et al., supra note 42, at 8–9.
224. Id.
225. Some scholars point out that “corporate governance is a contested concept, and there
is no commonly agreed definition of the term.” Annie Pye, Boards and Governance: 25 Years
of Qualitative Research with Directors of FTSE Companies, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 171, at 135, 142.
226. Ruth V. Aguilera et al., Regulation and Comparative Corporate Governance, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 171, at 23, 23.
227. Id.
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owner problem in corporations228 offer powerful tools for doing the same in
blockchain protocols. The key types of corporate governance roles
recognized by state and federal laws229 include fiduciaries230 and
gatekeepers.231 Corporate governance also relies heavily on disclosure
mechanisms to reduce information asymmetries between managers and
owners. This Part maps these key governance paradigms to various actors in
blockchain ecosystems. In so doing, this Part further explores the potential
for governance paradigms to alleviate some of the key conflicts of interest
currently encountered in off-chain governance paradigms.
A. Full Node Operators as Core Blockchain Protocol Fiduciaries
In August 2016, Professor Angela Walch initiated a fascinating discussion
with an American Banker article arguing that the open-source software
coders and miners of open-source blockchain protocols should be treated as
fiduciaries.232 Generally, law imposes fiduciary duties “when a person
undertakes to perform a service effectively and takes property, or accepts
power solely for that purpose.”233 The duties imposed include “both a duty
228. Corporate governance has long focused on the divergence of interests between
principals and agents, known as the principal-agent problem. Id. at 25. “The key idea is that
unmonitored managers will pursue goals that are not in the interests of shareholders—ranging
from actions that allow them to profit personally (embezzlement, misappropriations) to empire
building (hubris).” Id.
229. Many of the existing federal corporate governance statutes in the United States
materialized in the wake of corporate scandals resulting from high-profile governance crises.
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 192, at 1 (“The economic crises of the last decade prompted two
sweeping federal statutes affecting corporate governance. In response to the scandals that
followed in the wake of the dotcom bubble, Congress passed the Public Company Accounting
Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002 . . . . At the end of the decade, when the economy
suffered through an even worse downturn following the bursting of the housing bubble and
the subprime mortgage crisis, populist outrage motivated Congress to pass the Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank).”). These generally apply to
publicly traded companies. Id. Given the freely transferable nature of cryptocurrencies native
to public blockchain protocols, this Article explores whether the rules applicable to public
companies have value for public blockchain governance, in addition to the state rules which
traditionally apply to corporate governance. Note that, traditionally, state law supplied
corporate governance rules through their corporate statutes. Id. at 2. State rules, in addition to
governing private companies, continue to apply to publicly traded companies, even after the
enactment of additional federal rules. Id. at 21.
230. Id. at 43 (“The most basic principle of corporate governance is, as the Delaware
General Corporation Law puts it, that the corporation’s business and affairs ‘shall be managed
by or under the direction of a board of directors.’” (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a))).
231. Elisabeth de Fontenay, Private Equity Firms as Gatekeepers, 136 REV. BANKING &
FIN. L. 115, 136 (2013) (“Gatekeepers are broadly understood to be private actors that can
prevent companies’ misconduct in a specific market.”).
232. Walch, Call Blockchain Developers What They Are, supra note 21.
233. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209, 1223 (1995).
“Fiduciary law is triggered merely by the fiduciary’s consent to provide services, coupled with
entrustment.” Id. at 1224; see also Julian Velasco, Delimiting Fiduciary Status, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW 76, 82 (D. Gordon Smith & Andrew S. Gold eds., 2018) (“A
fiduciary relationship is one in which one party (the fiduciary) exercises discretionary power
over the significant practical interests of another (the beneficiary).” (quoting Paul B. Miller,
A Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 56 MCGILL L.J. 235, 262 (2011) (emphasis omitted))).
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of care—to act carefully and not negligently—and a duty of loyalty—to
perform their services in the interest of their entrustors and not in conflict of
interest.”234 Those that considered the idea after Professor Walch struggled
to identify an existing source of law that would impose fiduciary duties on
either software developers or miners.235 In her deeper investigation of the
issue, Professor Walch acknowledges that, although she continues to believe
that coders and miners arguably possess some of the core characteristics of
fiduciaries, she has not yet identified the basis for assigning fiduciary legal
duties, to whom duties are owed, what duties are owed, how to identify a
breach, or what consequences of breach would result.236
Ultimately, Professor Walch concludes that the right approach requires
“focus[ing] on the behaviours of software developers in the public
blockchain context.”237 In other words, the analysis of whether to treat
certain actors in the blockchain ecosystem as fiduciaries cries out for a
functional approach. As discussed above, blockchain protocols act, in many
ways, as the functional equivalents of corporations. Viewing public
blockchain protocols as corporate functional equivalents allows us to draw
boundaries around which actors in the blockchain ecosystem may shoulder
fiduciary obligations and to whom those obligations are owed. In particular,
although the discussion around whether open-source software developers
should be fiduciaries centered on blockchain core developers until now, there
seems to be no principled reason to limit the “coders-as-fiduciary” liability
to the blockchain context (or even just to core developers as opposed to all
open-source code developers).238 Thus, taken to its logical conclusion, the
“coders-as-fiduciary” argument could apply to open-source software
developers contributing to the Internet Protocol, Linux, Apache, and any
other open-source software development effort. This would represent an
unprecedented change in the legal approach to governing these communities.
It also ignores the realities of the governance systems of many open-source
software development efforts.239
Despite the general definition of a fiduciary relationship existing whenever
an entrustor trusts another person with the management of assets,240 under
the jurisprudential principle of lex specialis, when “the fiduciary relationship
arises in conjunction with another legal relationship, the bargain concerning
these functions and entrusted powers is governed initially by the law
234. Frankel, supra note 233, at 1210.
235. Judith Alison Lee, Blockchain Technology and Legal Implications of ‘Crypto 2.0,’
104 Banking Rep. (BNA) 13, at 67 (Mar. 31, 2015).
236. Walch, In Code(rs) We Trust, supra note 21, at 71–76.
237. Id. at 77.
238. For example, in her work, Angela Walch does not propose any limiting principle that
would prevent application of her “coder-as-fiduciary” idea from going beyond the blockchain
context to all other open-source projects. See generally Walch, In Code(rs) We Trust, supra
note 21.
239. For a more detailed discussion of why the realities of open-source software
development do not comport well with the theory of “coder-as-fiduciary,” see generally Haque
et al., supra note 50.
240. See supra notes 231–32 and accompanying text.
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governing that legal relationship.”241 For example, the Model Business
Corporation Act and the Delaware Corporation Act draw boundaries around
which actors in a corporation owe fiduciary duties and under what
circumstances.242 Those carrying out the function of a director or majority
shareholder (under certain circumstances) owe fiduciary obligations, and
those obligations are owed to the corporation and its shareholders.243
Furthermore, corporations remain free, to a certain extent, to shape the scope
of liability for potential breaches of fiduciary duties via contract in the
entity’s governing documents.244 The relative strength or weakness of
fiduciary duties in a given corporate governance structure reflects certain
values related to the nature and purpose of a corporation.245 The more
strongly held the view that the corporation is a nexus of contracts, the weaker
the belief in strong fiduciary duties.246 Similarly, when owners of a company
want an expert group of managers strongly enough, they may be willing to
forgo a stronger level of protection and opt instead for weaker fiduciary
duties.247 Typically, state governments make such policy decisions and
reflect them in default and mandatory statutory rules. Even this basic
governance paradigm offers important lessons for blockchain protocol
governance.248 Specifically, a design trade-off exists between protecting
users by imposing fiduciary duties on node operators and maintaining the

241. Frankel, supra note 233, at 1233.
242. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(b)(7), 141 (2020); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§§ 2.02(b)(4), 8.30, 8.31 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); see also Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71
CALIF. L. REV. 795, 795–96 (1983) (“In the business realm, the fiduciary duties of partners,
corporate directors, and officers originated with the formation of partnerships and
corporations, but majority shareholders were not subjected to fiduciary duties until this
century.”). Under the law of business trusts, the trustees owe fiduciary duties to the trust’s
certificate holders in the same way that directors owe fiduciary duties to a corporation’s
shareholders. See John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument
of Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 182 (1997) (noting that the business trust form
“automatically invokes the distinctive protective regime of trust fiduciary law for safeguarding
the interests of investors or other beneficiaries”).
243. D. Gordon Smith & Andrew S. Gold, Introduction to RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 233, at 1, 1 (“Trustees are fiduciaries for the beneficiaries of the
trust. People with managerial power in a business organization—partners, officers, directors,
and so forth—are fiduciaries for the owners of the business organization.”); Christopher M.
Bruner, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties and Liabilities in U.S. and U.K. Business Entities, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 233, at 285, 287 (“In Delaware,
fiduciary duties of loyalty and care are owed by directors, officers, and controlling
shareholders ‘to the corporation and its stockholders.’” (quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d
503, 510 (Del. 1939))).
244. See Bruner, supra note 243, at 288–89 (“While the duties themselves are cabined only
in [a few] limited respects, the [Delaware General Corporation Law] and case law do provide
substantial leeway to carve back at fiduciaries’ exposure to monetary liability for care
breaches—an approach reflecting a pragmatic desire to incentivize entrepreneurial risktaking. . . . The [Model Business Corporation Act] likewise resembles Delaware in providing
substantial latitude to limit or eliminate monetary liability for care breaches.”).
245. Rodrigues, supra note 181, at 10–12.
246. See Bruner, supra note 243, at 302.
247. See id.
248. Rodrigues, supra note 181, at 10–16.
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level of unfettered discretion left to node operators.249 The exercise of
crafting a corporate crypto-governance contract between participants in a
blockchain ecosystem will force a transparent discussion about such tradeoffs. Such transparency and discussion, standing alone, offer some benefits
of adopting an (un)corporate crypto-governance model.
Notably, many open-source software development projects recognize the
power imbalances in their ecosystems and create contractual codes of
conduct and organizational bylaws that look quite similar to corporate
governing documents.250 In fact, some blockchain ecosystems are already
forming governance structures modeled on corporate governance and their
open-source predecessors.251 As elaborated upon more fully below, a
detailed mapping of blockchain participants to corporate governance actors
reveals that public blockchain protocols should consider contractually
assigning full nodes participating in the consensus mechanism of blockchain
protocols (for example, miners in the Bitcoin blockchain or masternode
operators in the Dash protocol)252 the responsibilities of core protocol
fiduciaries that owe duties to cryptocurrency holders. Conversely, such a
model would point to restraint in assigning fiduciary duties to the developers
of blockchain protocol open-source code, including the core developers,
except under certain exceptional circumstances.253
249. Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Surveillance Intermediaries, 70 STAN. L. REV. 99, 164 (2018)
(“The tradeoff thesis . . . applies more generally to any situation in which we’re trying to
maximize a set of values, at least some of the time.”).
250. See generally RITVO ET AL., supra note 40; Dafermos, supra note 164; Fish et al.,
supra note 40.
251. See, e.g., Governance Guidelines, supra note 39.
252. For an explanation of how this Article uses the term “full node operators” and why,
see supra note 63.
253. In “If Rockefeller Were a Coder,” I argued that decentralized business organizations,
including blockchain protocols themselves, should consider organizing as business trusts in
order to escape the default penalty (personal liability) imposed on partnerships. See generally
Reyes, Rockefeller, supra note 30. The discussion here regarding corporate governance fits
the business trust model as well. The trustee holders of tokens would owe fiduciary duties to
the certificate holders of tokens. Business trust law relies on the same trust fiduciary law that
applies in the donative trust context. Tamar Frankel, The Delaware Business Trust Act Failure
as the New Corporate Law, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 325, 335 (2001) (“If a corporation manages
other people’s money and performs Trust Services, it is regulated as a trust, and its duties to
the beneficiaries are trustees’ duties.”); Langbein, supra note 242, at 182 (“Another trait of
the trust form that is of fundamental importance to transaction planers is that the trust
automatically invokes the distinctive protective regime of trust fiduciary law for safeguarding
the interests of investors or other beneficiaries.”). See generally In re Dean’s Tr., 394 P.2d
432 (Haw. 1964); Flynn v. La Salle Nat’l Bank, 137 N.E.2d 71 (Ill. 1956); Wallace v. Malooly,
122 N.E.2d 275 (Ill. 1954). Also note that at least one court found that holders of certificates
of beneficial ownership in trusts do not owe fiduciary duties to each other. Krensky v. De
Swarte, 82 N.E.2d 168 (Ill. App. Ct. 1948). As a result, the fiduciary regime applicable to
business trusts resembles that of corporations—with trustees as directors and certificate
holders as shareholders. Langbein, supra note 242, at 182 (calling the duties “loyalty and
prudence”). The duty of loyalty ensures the trustees will operate the trust “solely in the interest
of the beneficiaries.” Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRS. § 170(1) (AM. LAW INST.
1957)). As in the corporate context, this means that trustees must refrain from self-dealing
and conflict-of-interest transactions. Id. Trustees also owe a duty of care to trust certificate
holders, meaning that the trustee owes “a duty to the beneficiary in administering the trust to
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Directors hold the positions of core fiduciaries in the corporate context.254
As a result of the discretion they wield when managing the business, directors
owe duties of care and loyalty to the owners of the company—the
shareholders.255 When we map these functions of directors to the players in
a public blockchain protocol, core developers and open-source software
contributors do not serve the same function as directors—rather, full node
operators do. As a result, the corporate governance model does not provide
support for imposing fiduciary obligations on the developers of the opensource computer code that comprises the blockchain protocol.256 At no point
do the developers of open-source computer code assume the role of a director
in a corporation, unless they otherwise participate in the protocol as a node
operator or hold a significant amount of the protocol’s native cryptocurrency.
This result reflects the policy aims of fiduciary law, the main purpose of
which “is to reduce entrustors’ risk from embezzlement of their entrusted
property or interests, and to reduce the costs of monitoring fiduciaries.”257
At no point do cryptocurrency owners entrust assets to open-source software

exercise such care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his
own property.” Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRS. § 174 (AM. LAW INST. 1957)).
The fiduciary trust obligations are default rules that parties can change through contract,
although some state statutes may impose minimum requirements. See id. at 183–85. I also
argued that smart contracts could be business trusts. The (un)corporate crypto-governance
model applies to a distributed business entity (DBE) at the smart contract level as well, for the
most part. Smart contracts that fulfill the role of trustees owe holders smart contract tokens
fiduciary duties under the DBE model. Two characteristics of fiduciaries generally, and of
trustees specifically, involve the substitution role of the fiduciary and the delegation of power
to the fiduciary. Frankel, supra note 242, at 808–09. The fiduciary acts as a substitute for the
entrustor and the entrustor delegates to the fiduciary the power required for the fiduciary to do
so efficiently. Id. In the context of smart contract DBEs, the entrustors delegate to the smart
contract the power to control certain assets and expect the smart contract to act as a substitute
for the entrustors in using those assets for the creation of profit. Of the three levels of DBEs,
the smart contract poses unique questions for the issue of fiduciary obligations. Setting aside
those questions for now, the point here is that the model of (un)corporate crypto-governance
outlined in this Article holds promise and implications for business entities conducted at any
level of the blockchain technology stack. However, the implications for business entities at
other levels of the technology stack deserve further investigation and research, particularly
because, as noted above, they often devolve control back to the owners of the enterprise in
ways that many prominent blockchain protocols have not yet achieved via off-chain
governance. See generally Reyes, supra note 190.
254. Smith & Gold, supra note 243, at 7 (“Directors manage the business and affairs of the
corporation. This management role necessarily entails the exercise of discretion, which is
widely recognized as an essential aspect of fiduciary relationships.”).
255. Id.; see also Bruner, supra note 243, at 287.
256. Notably, to the extent that the concern underlying the push to recognize open-source
software developers as fiduciaries lies in holding coders accountable for negligent coding that
results in a bug in the protocol, fiduciary law is unnecessary. All individuals face liability for
torts they commit. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2005). Any
perceived failure of tort law to address such scenarios should be treated within that substantive
legal domain, and a whole other line of scholarly literature investigates those issues. See, e.g.,
Bryan H. Choi, Crashworthy Code, 94 WASH. L. REV. 39 (2019); Bryan H. Choi, Software as
a Profession, 33 HARV. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2020).
257. Frankel, supra note 233, at 1223.
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developers. Rather, cryptocurrency owners entrust their assets to the
blockchain protocol’s full node operators.258
While the literature confirms that certain open-source software developers
possess significant influence in a blockchain ecosystem,259 those developers
have no power, standing alone, to dispose of, embezzle, or otherwise impact
the use of entrustors’ assets. For example, the Bitcoin blockchain’s core
development team possesses significant influence over the trajectory of that
protocol’s code.260 Specifically, although technical improvements to the
Bitcoin core software occur through “pull requests” and can be contributed
by anyone,261 more substantial changes to the Bitcoin blockchain occur
through the BIP process.262 Although anyone may suggest a BIP and such
BIPs must be made available for review by the broader open-source
community,263 the core developers ultimately make the final decision as to
whether to introduce a BIP to the protocol.264 Nevertheless, any attempt to
introduce a BIP to the protocol as a software update must be approved by a
majority of the node operators, and an update the broader community
disagrees with may be rejected.265 Because the full node operators alone
hold this power to adopt updates to the protocol software, they alone have
the ability to manage the core asset of the enterprise: the blockchain

258. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 104–05 (listing the tasks of bitcoin miners as
listening for transactions, maintaining blockchain and listening for new blocks, assembling a
candidate block, finding a nonce that makes your block valid, hoping your block is accepted,
and profiting).
259. De Filippi & Loveluck, supra note 14, at 18.
260. Id. (“[W]hile anyone is entitled to submit changes to the software (such as bug fixes,
incremental improvements, etc.), only a small number of individuals (the core developers)
have the power to decide which changes shall be incorporated into the main branch of the
software.”). But see NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 171 (“How powerful are these
people? In one sense, they’re very powerful, because you could argue that any of the rule
changes to the code that they make will get shipped in Bitcoin Core and will be followed by
default. . . . In another sense, they’re not powerful at all. Because it’s open-source software,
anyone can copy and modify it (i.e., fork the software at any time), and so if the lead
developers start behaving in a way that the community doesn’t like, the community can go in
a different direction.”).
261. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 170 (“Anyone can contribute technical
improvements via ‘pull requests’ to Bitcoin Core, a familiar process in the world of opensource software. More substantial changes, especially protocol modifications, use a process
called ‘Bitcoin Improvement Proposals’ (BIPs).”).
262. “A BIP is a design document providing information to the Bitcoin community, or
describing a new feature for Bitcoin or its processes or environment. The BIP should provide
a concise technical specification of the feature and a rationale for the feature.” De Filippi &
Loveluck, supra note 14, at 19 n.30.
263. Id. at 19.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 19–20 (“Yet, ultimately, the sovereignty of the overall project rests with the
people—i.e. the Bitcoin users and miners. If the core developers were to make a modification
to the code that the community disagrees with (the miners, in particular), the community might
simply refuse to run the new code.”); see also NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 171
(“Because it’s open source software, anyone can copy and modify it (i.e., fork the software at
any time), and so if the lead developers start behaving in a way that the community doesn’t
like, the community can go in a different direction.”).
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protocol.266 Only the full node operators hold the power to make updates to
the blockchain protocol to which users have entrusted their value. The final
decision of the node operators, not the recommendations of the core
developers, ultimately impact the value of cryptocurrency held by users.267
As a result, full node operators most closely approximate the role of corporate
directors268 and therefore represent the more likely candidates for assigning
fiduciary duties in public blockchain protocols.
As fiduciaries under a contractually adopted corporate governance model,
the full node operators would agree to owe duties of care and loyalty to the
holders of the cryptocurrency used on the protocol.269 Members of the
community would set the level of responsibility they deem appropriate via
contract, with the general goals of constraining self-interested votes on BIPs,
EIPs,270 and other protocol updates;271 offering increased disincentives for
launching a 51 percent or other node attack;272 and providing a shield against
undue influence from members of the core developer community. In
particular, the duty of care would require that full node operators make
decisions about protocol consensus and protocol changes in a reasonable
manner and in the best interests of the protocol.273 Transplanting this

266. In the Bitcoin blockchain, for example, miners decide “[w]hich transactions to
include,” “[w]hich block to mine on,” how to choose “between blocks at the same height,”
and “[w]hen to announce new blocks.” NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 131. And these
decisions are required simply to confirm new transactions occurring on the network. Id. In
addition, miners in the Bitcoin blockchain decide when to adopt changes to the protocol. See
id. at 73–74 (describing the processes for implementing changes to the protocol via soft and
hard forks).
267. See id.
268. Or trustees in a business trust. See Reyes, Rockefeller, supra note 30.
269. See Bruner, supra note 243, at 287. There is some discussion in the literature as to
whether the duty of care is actually a fiduciary duty. See, e.g., Christopher M. Bruner, Is the
Corporate Director’s Duty of Care a ‘Fiduciary’ Duty?: Does it Matter?, 48 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 1027, 1033–36 (2013). Nevertheless, U.S. jurisprudence predominately continues to
consider the duties of care and loyalty to both be fiduciary duties. Id. at 1039–51.
270. EIPs, ETHEREUM IMPROVEMENT PROPOSALS, https://eips.ethereum.org/ [https://
perma.cc/Y526-839R] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020) (“Ethereum Improvement Proposals (EIPs)
describe standards for the Ethereum platform, including core protocol specifications, client
APIs, and contract standards.”).
271. Other protocols call these proposals something else and have other processes for
considering them. See, e.g., Dash Improvement Proposals (DIPs), GITHUB, https://
github.com/dashpay/dips [https://perma.cc/UV2D-2RGH] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020); NEP
Repo #7, GITHUB, https://github.com/namecoin/meta/issues/7 [https://perma.cc/XZS98EYH] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020). In fact, the Internet Protocol boasts a similar process.
NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 174 (“[T]he BIP process is reminiscent of the RFC, or
Request for Comments, which is a type of standards-setting document for the Internet.”).
272. Although the 51 percent attack attracts the most media attention, a variety of potential
node attacks could occur. See, e.g., NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 130–36 (describing
a variety of attacks that could be perpetrated by miners); id. at 204–05 (describing blockdiscarding attacks); id. at 210 (describing forking attacks).
273. See D. GORDON SMITH & CYNTHIA A. WILLIAMS, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES,
PROBLEMS, AND CASE STUDIES 362 (3d ed. 2012); see also Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432
A.2d 814, 820 (N.J. 1981) (stating that a director must “discharge their duties in good faith
and with [the] degree of diligence, care and skill which ordinarily prudent men would exercise
under similar circumstances in like positions”).
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requirement from corporate law might require full node operators to become
sufficiently educated about the proposal before making a decision,274
undertake an investigation of the proposal and its expected effect on the
protocol,275 independently test the proposed code,276 and ensure that the vote
was not otherwise undertaken for bad faith purposes.277 Fulfilling such
duties may require full node operators to undertake relatively significant
activities before committing to an updated version of the software. For
example, courts read into the requirement to be informed an expectation that
the decision maker gather outside information, consult with experts, and
consider relevant test data when appropriate.278
Furthermore, in the corporate context, the duty of loyalty requires that
directors “affirmatively . . . protect the interests of the corporation committed
to [its] charge, [and] refrain from doing anything that would work injury to
the corporation, or to deprive it of profit or advantage which its skill and
ability might properly bring to it.”279 This duty generally boils down to
requirements that directors refrain from engaging in undisclosed and
unapproved self-dealing transactions280 and taking opportunities that belong
to the corporation for personal benefit.281 The duty of loyalty in the
blockchain protocol context will look slightly different than in the corporate
context but nevertheless offers a helpful restraint on the diverging interests
of cryptocurrency holders and full node operators. For example, overlaying
the corporate prohibition on usurping corporate opportunities on the
responsibilities of full node operators disincentivizes launching a node attack
or engaging in double spending or other dishonest behavior.282 Those node
274. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
275. See generally In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch.
2003).
276. See generally Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858.
277. See generally Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1994); McPadden
v. Sidhu, 964 A.2d 1262 (Del. Ch. 2008).
278. Francis, 432 A.2d at 823 (“Sometimes a director may be required to seek the advice
of counsel. . . . The duty to seek the assistance of counsel can extend to areas other than the
interpretation of corporation instruments. Modern corporate practice recognizes that on
occasion a director should seek outside advice.”).
279. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
280. Sung Hui Kim, Fiduciary Law’s Anti-corruption Norm, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 233, at 117, 135 (“Courts have broadly but inconsistently
proscribed the fiduciary’s use of an entrusted position for self-regarding gain where the
fiduciary failed to disclose the gain to [the] beneficiary.”); Lionel Smith, Fiduciary
Relationships: Ensuring the Loyal Exercise of Judgement on Behalf of Another, 130 LAW Q.
REV. 608, 609 (2014) (explaining the policy concern underlying the rule as the prevention of
self-enrichment at the beneficiary’s expense).
281. Guth, 5 A.2d. at 511 (“[I]f there is presented to a corporate officer or director a
business opportunity which the corporation is financially able to undertake, is, from its nature
in the line of the corporation’s business and is of practical advantage to it, is one in which the
corporation has an interest or a reasonable expectancy, and, by embracing the opportunity, the
self-interest of the officer or director will be brought into conflict with that of [the] corporation,
the law will not permit him to seize the opportunity for himself.”).
282. The threat of a 51 percent attack earned new relevance when Ethereum Classic
suffered a suspected successful 51 percent attack that “reorganized” more than one hundred
blocks. Nikhilesh De & Christine Kim, Coinbase Suspends Ethereum Classic After
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operators that financially benefit from participating in a 51 percent or other
network attack may be required to disgorge that financial benefit after a
successful suit for breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty.283 Requiring full node
operators to refrain from undisclosed and unapproved self-dealing
transactions would require that approval of BIPs or other protocol updates be
based on their technical merits and that whenever a node operator’s personal
economic interest might be implicated, that conflict of interest be
disclosed.284 These outcomes may affect the basic motivations for becoming
node operators and may change some cultural elements of the blockchain
ecosystem.285
Some node operators argue that imposing a fiduciary overlay on their
activities makes little sense because many node operators do not actively
make decisions about protocol consensus.286 Rather, many node operators
merely run the default client settings.287 However, when updates to the
protocol pose some level of controversy, node operators often actively
campaign for their preferred position on whether to integrate the update.288
In such cases, node operators participate in private and public votes on the
matter before the upgrade is implemented.289 Further, recent events indicate
that, in certain circumstances, node operators can collude sufficiently to
Blockchain History Rewrites, COINDESK (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.coindesk.com/coinbasesuspends-ethereum-classic-after-blockchain-history-rewrites
[https://perma.cc/5BQWMK3V].
283. Smith & Gold, supra note 243, at 6 (“Fiduciary law makes use of distinctive remedies,
most notably the disgorgement remedy. Disgorgement is only rarely applied in contract
settings, yet it is commonly adopted in response to fiduciary disloyalty.”).
284. For an example of a protocol upgrade that implicates the financial self-interest of node
operators, see the Ethereum Constantinople upgrade. See ANDREAS M. ANTONOPOULOS &
GAVIN WOOD, MASTERING ETHEREUM: BUILDING SMART CONTRACTS AND DAPPS 5 (2019).
Ethereum is moving from a proof-of-work consensus mechanism to a proof-of-stake
consensus mechanism:
The message that is going out in the community is that miners are not ready to switch
to [proof of stake]. The protocol, which is fairly more economical than [proof of
work], does not require miners to put a massive amount of computational data to
keep the network running and secure. Instead, it choses miners to verify transactions
based on how much Ether they hold. . . . Also, Constantinople will reduce mining
rewards from 3 ETH to 2 ETH in an already difficult market.
Davit Babayan, Only 16% of Ethereum Nodes Upgrade Before Hard Fork, It’s a Nonissue,
NEWS BTC (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.newsbtc.com/2019/01/15/only-16-of-ethereumnodes-upgraded-before-hard-fork-its-a-nonissue/ [https://perma.cc/2JRF-D45V].
285. Indeed, society should always expect ripple effects to result from transplanting law
into code or code into law. See Reyes, Conceptualizing Cryptolaw, supra note 30, at 428.
286. De Filippi & Loveluck, supra note 14, at 10 (noting the passivity of some nodes).
287. See NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 136.
288. Haque et al., supra note 50, at 163, 170 (describing user-activated soft forks and flag
days and discussing a vote via carbonvote.com regarding the hard fork following the DAO
incident as an example of debate and decision-making in protocol communities); see also
Mike Dalton, Bitcoin Cash Hard Fork: What You Need to Know, UNHASHED (Nov. 26,
2018), https://unhashed.com/cryptocurrency-news/bitcoin-cash-hard-fork-what-you-need-toknow/ [https://perma.cc/N5SW-N8DV] (describing the mining factions at work and
explaining that, only “[a]fter months of debate and preparation from mining factions, the
Bitcoin Cash hard fork finally took place in mid-November”).
289. See Haque et al., supra note 50, at 162–63.
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undertake some of the network attacks previously considered merely
theoretical.290 Notably, however, this description of nodes and how they
operate does not adequately reflect the diversity of node operators. The
reality is that node operators represent a diverse group. Any community
contract adopting fiduciary duties for node operators should take that
diversity into account when considering the scope of liability for breaches of
fiduciary duties.291 Such contracts should also affirmatively consider the
fluid nature of many nodes. Nodes enter and exit the protocol system all the
time. The community must decide whether such entrances and exits mean
anything for governance and, if so, how to manage those transitions.292 Such
complex realities reaffirm the importance of allowing blockchain
communities to privately order their governance affairs rather than imposing
a top-down, one-size-fits-all solution. Governance systems based on contract
that borrow elements of corporate governance paradigms offer a path
forward.
B. Majority Shareholders as Fiduciaries at Key Moments
In the corporate context, controlling shareholders owe fiduciary duties
under certain circumstances.293 In particular, when a controlling shareholder
stands on both sides of a transaction, the transaction generally must survive
an entire fairness standard.294 Generally, the law views a shareholder as
controlling if the shareholder owns 51 percent or more of the voting
shares,295 if a minority shareholder nonetheless dominates the corporation
through actual control of corporate conduct,296 or if a group of unaffiliated
290. See De & Kim, supra note 282.
291. This Article does not address the issues of enforcement or dispute resolution in the
event of a governance failure under the (un)corporate crypto-governance model. Rather, I
reserve that discussion for a future work.
292. Notably, several open-source projects already do this, including several in the
blockchain space. See, e.g., Code of Conduct, APACHE SOFTWARE FOUND., https://
www.apache.org/foundation/policies/conduct.html [https://perma.cc/L6CP-YKRC] (last
visited Mar. 17, 2020); Contributor Covenant Code of Conduct, LINUX KERNEL, https://
www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/code-of-conduct.html
[https://perma.cc/Z2UUYV6V] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020); Governance Guidelines, supra note 39; Tracy Kuhrt,
Hyperledger Code of Conduct, HYPERLEDGER (Jan. 22, 2019), https://wiki.hyperledger.org/
community/hyperledger-project-code-of-conduct [https://perma.cc/4B5C-U33H];
293. See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1113 (Del. 1994);
Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 1987) (stating that
controlling shareholders are company fiduciaries); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,
705 (Del. 1983) (stating that a controlling shareholder owed a fiduciary duty to minority
shareholders in a cash-out merger).
294. See generally Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014); see also
WILLIAM K. SJOSTROM, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: A TRANSACTIONAL APPROACH 519 (2d
ed. 2016).
295. Weinstein Enters., Inc. v. Orloff, 870 A.2d 499, 507 (Del. 2005) (“[I]t is well
established in the corporate jurisprudence of Delaware that control exists when a stockholder
owns, directly or indirectly, more than half of a corporation’s voting power.”).
296. In re W. Nat’l Corp. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 15927-CC, 2000 WL 710192, at *20
(Del. Ch. May 22, 2000) (holding that a “significant stockholder that does not, as a general
matter, exercise actual control over the investee’s business and affairs or over the investee’s
board of directors but does, in fact, exercise actual control over the board of directors during
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shareholders creates a group via contract that gives them controlling voting
power.297 When a controlling shareholder thus defined stands on both sides
of the transaction, it must demonstrate that the transaction was made entirely
fair by implementing systems designed to cleanse the transaction of any selfdealing taint.298 When transplanted to the blockchain protocol context, these
rules surrounding majority shareholders implicate potential duties at key
moments for large holders of cryptocurrency, particularly if the significant
cryptocurrency ownership is coupled with a unique influence on the
blockchain protocol community.
In particular, if a controlling cryptocurrency owner (one that owns 51
percent or more or that owns a significant amount of cryptocurrency and also
wields some unique power in the protocol community—for example, by
virtue of being a founder or by reputation) recommends a protocol upgrade
with the potential to result in personal economic benefit, that proposal might
be subject to closer scrutiny along the lines of the entire fairness standard for
corporate controlling shareholder transactions. The contract among the
protocol governance participants could address the process for entire fairness
ratification in several ways. A standing committee of independent experts
could be formed at the relevant foundation299 for the purpose of reviewing
and opining on the fairness and merits of such proposals. Alternatively, the
proposal could be put to a vote of the minority cryptocurrency owners in the
ecosystem. If a majority of them approve the transaction on an informed
basis, then the standard of entire fairness would (roughly) be satisfied. The
community could also impose their own standards for determining entire
fairness in such situations. The goal in any case would be to inform the entire
community of the potential conflict of interest and allow the proposal to be
weighed on the merits notwithstanding the conflict. This type of radical
transparency mirrors the vision and ethos of many blockchain protocol
communities and protects the reputation of the protocol from scrutiny if the
community approves and implements the transaction.300

the course of a particular transaction, can assume fiduciary duties for purposes of that
transaction”).
297. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 25–27 (Del. Ch. 2010) (finding
that cosigners of a voting trust were controlling fiduciaries because they had enough votes to
elect the board).
298. Jonathan Rosenberg & Alexandra Lewis-Reisen, Controlling-Shareholder RelatedParty Transactions Under Delaware Law—a Primer and Practical Guide, HARV. L. SCH. F.
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 30, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2017/08/30/controlling-shareholder-related-party-transactions-under-delaware-law/ [https://
perma.cc/7545-URST] (explaining that “there is no single recipe for an ‘entirely fair’
controlling-shareholder transaction” and offering useful guidelines from case law to achieve
entire fairness).
299. For example, the Bitcoin Foundation or the Ethereum Foundation.
300. For example, this type of transparency would have been useful for sustaining
legitimacy of governance mechanisms during the DAO hard fork discussion. ANTONOPOULOS
& WOOD, supra note 284, at 325 (discussing the community disagreement relating to the hard
fork implemented after the DAO theft and how strong feelings led many to opt out of the
original Ethereum protocol).
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C. Core Developers, Founders, and Protocol Foundations as Gatekeepers
Generally speaking, the term “gatekeeper” refers to “private actors that can
prevent companies’ misconduct in a specific market.”301 Corporate
governance literature views the role of “gatekeepers” as reducing the
information asymmetry that necessarily plagues the market for corporate
securities, but with specific focus on information related to misconduct.302
Corporations are the sole source of information regarding the value allegedly
represented by their stock.303 Those purchasing corporate shares need a way
to reduce incentives for corporations to intentionally defraud the market or
carelessly provide misinformation to market participants.304 To that end,
“[a]s a form of bonding the credibility of their disclosures, the company hires
various outsiders—such as an outside auditor, underwriters, and legal
counsel—to function as reputational intermediaries.”305 The idea is that,
because the viability of their own business depends on their reputation, these
reputational intermediaries ensure their clients do not defraud the market,
intentionally or otherwise.306 Such reputational intermediaries are referred
to as “gatekeepers” because they act as a check on fraud in capital markets
and are considered an entrenched element of corporate governance.307
Public blockchain protocols do not possess a strong tradition of using
auditors, whether of finances or of code.308 Although some blockchain
protocol foundations retain attorneys, after admonitions from various SEC
commissioners, few lawyers will offer an opinion letter on any aspect of a
blockchain enterprise.309 Instead, the reputation of a blockchain protocol
301. See de Fontenay, supra note 231, at 136.
302. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Lawyers as Gatekeepers, 8 UCLA
J. SCHOLARLY PERSP. 5 (2012).
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 192, at 179.
306. See id.
307. John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning
Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 309 (2004) (defining a gatekeeper as “a reputational
intermediary who provides verification or certification services to investors”); John C. Coffee,
Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 BUS. LAW. 1403, 1405
(2002) (characterizing gatekeepers in the capital markets context as reputational
intermediaries); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 618 (1984).
308. In fact, even when code allegedly had been audited, the audit proved to be relatively
useless. In the case of the DAO, for example, creator Christoph Jentzsch wrote: “We believe
more security audits or more tests would have made no difference. The main problem was
that reviewers did not know what to look for.” Christoph Jentzsch, The History of the DAO
and Lessons Learned, MEDIUM: SLOCK.IT BLOG (Aug. 24, 2016), https://blog.slock.it/thehistory-of-the-dao-and-lessons-learned-d06740f8cfa5 [https://perma.cc/FN2A-M2BB].
309. Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Opening Remarks at the
Securities Regulation Institute in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/speech-clayton-012218 [https://perma.cc/GBL9-N4LM] (“Our securities laws—
and 80 plus years of practice—assume that securities lawyers, accountants, underwriters, and
dealers will act responsibly. . . . Legal advice (or in the cases I will cite, the lack thereof)
surrounding ICOs helps illustrate this point. . . . First, and most disturbing to me, there are
ICOs where the lawyers involved appear to be, on the one hand, assisting promoters in
structuring offerings of products that have many of the key features of a securities offering,

2020]

(UN)CORPORATE CRYPTO-GOVERNANCE

1919

often correlates to the reputations of its core development team, its founders,
and, occasionally, an organizing foundation that stands behind the
protocol.310 Such individuals and entities act as gatekeepers for public
blockchain protocols because they have access to information that the general
market of protocol participants does not have and they act as reputational
intermediaries for the protocols. Members of the core developer teams, for
example, often work on protocol code without promise of specific
remuneration.311 Instead, the reputational boost obtained by acting as a core
developer leads to other opportunities for economic gain.312 Further, to gain
entrance to the core development team requires acceptance by the community
as a reputable expert in the protocol being managed.313 In other words, core
developers exist in a loop of reputational intermediaries—acting as a
reputational intermediary for the protocol while also allowing their own
reputation to rise or fall with the integrity of the protocol. Thus, if a core
developer becomes aware of misconduct at the protocol level, the core
developer is properly incentivized to expose it in order to preserve his or her
reputation and future economic prospects. This loosely resembles the
reputational intermediary role played by lawyers and auditors in the
corporate governance space.
Like core developers, a founder’s reputation will rise or fall with the
success of the public blockchain protocol he or she created. Although a
founder occasionally has special weight in a blockchain community, the cost
of that increased influence is an increased reputational hit for any misuse of
influence. As such, a founder remains incentivized to report and address
misconduct in much the same way as the core developers. In fact, viewing
blockchain governance through a corporate governance lens helps explain
the Ethereum community’s choice to hard fork the Ethereum protocol after
the DAO hack.314 The DAO hack reflected poorly on the reputation of the

but call it an ‘ICO,’ which sounds pretty close to an ‘IPO.’ On the other hand, those lawyers
claim the products are not securities, and the promoters proceed without compliance with the
securities laws, which deprives investors of the substantive and procedural investor protection
requirements of our securities laws.”).
310. This is true in any open-source system. See Benkler, supra note 2, at 387–88
(discussing the importance of quality in Wikipedia’s ethos).
311. Id. at 423–36.
312. Id. at 424–25 (“[T]here is a variety of indirect appropriation mechanisms for those
who engage in free software development. These range from the amorphous category of
reputation gains to much more mundane benefits, such as consulting contracts, customization
services, and increases in human capital that are paid for by employers who can use the skills
gained from participation in free software development in proprietary projects.”).
313. See, e.g., Python Developer’s Guide, PYTHON, https://devguide.python.org/coredev/
[https://perma.cc/VXU9-C9JR] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020) (“When you have consistently
contributed patches which meet quality standards without requiring extensive rewrites prior
to being committed, you may qualify for commit privileges and become a core developer of
Python.”).
314. See generally Michael del Castillo, The Hard Fork: What’s About to Happen to
Ethereum and the DAO, COINDESK (July 24, 2016), https://www.coindesk.com/hard-forkethereum-dao [https://perma.cc/7U9G-AN6X].
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Ethereum protocol and its widely publicized project—the DAO.315 To
protect the reputation of the protocol, its founder—Vitalik Buterin—and the
core development team returned the funds affected by the incident to their
original owners.316 The debate surrounding the hard fork and the continued
discussions about the relative value of Ethereum and Ethereum Classic317
reflect different value judgments about which elements of the Ethereum
protocol reputation are most important:
equity and fairness or
immutability.318
The effectiveness of a protocol foundation as a reputational intermediary
seems somewhat more attenuated. However, some literature on corporate
gatekeepers views any entity with increased access to information as being
in a position to intervene when a corporation undertakes bad conduct as a
potential gatekeeper.319 In that sense, a protocol foundation like the
Ethereum Foundation, the Bitcoin Foundation, or the Chamber of Digital
Commerce might still be considered a gatekeeper. The reduced incentive to
expose bad conduct in this context (and actual failure to do so during the last
several decades) led to an extensive discussion in the literature as to whether,
how, and to what extent to hold gatekeepers accountable.320 A similar
investigation into the possibilities of holding the actors in blockchain
governance accountable for governance failures, even if blockchain
communities adopt the type of governance contracts proposed here, is
beyond the scope of this Article. Such questions, however, remain a rich area
for further research.
CONCLUSION
Blockchain technology was born out of a Cypherpunk vision for regulation
without sacrificing privacy. This vision feeds a call by some in the
blockchain technology ecosystem to view computer code as the only law
315. Michael del Castillo, Ethereum Executes Blockchain Hard Fork to Return DAO
Funds, COINDESK (July 20, 2016), https://www.coindesk.com/ethereum-executesblockchain-hard-fork-return-dao-investor-funds [https://perma.cc/SG6U-J3YU].
316. Id.
317. See Ali Raza, ETC vs. ETH: Story of Ethereum and Ethereum Classic, GLOBAL COIN
REP. (Oct. 10, 2018), https://globalcoinreport.com/etc-vs-eth-ethereum-ethereum-classic/
[https://perma.cc/JXQ9-S8UJ].
318. See id.
319. Kraakman, supra note 231, at 54; see also de Fontenay, supra note 231, at 136 (“The
precise definition of a gatekeeper is somewhat elusive, however, as the gatekeeper literature
has evolved in two directions. The first, associated with Reinier Kraakman, defines a
gatekeeper as any party from whom a company needs a good or service, and who can prevent
the company’s misconduct simply by refusing to provide it.”).
320. See, e.g., Arthur B. Laby, Differentiating Gatekeepers, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM.
L. 119, 119–20 (2006) (“While [the reputational intermediary] model has merits, it fails to
distinguish among gatekeepers, who are likely to respond differently to incentives. It also
fails to appreciate differences in the character of a gatekeeper’s relationship with a primary
violator and to consider whether such differences bear upon gatekeeper behavior.”); Assaf
Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53, 62–63 (2003) (proposing a three-part
mechanism for gatekeeper liability); Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A
Proposal for a Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491, 492 (2001) (proposing
a regime of strict gatekeeper liability for securities fraud).
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applicable to blockchain protocols, transactions conducted on the protocols,
and DAOs.321 In Professor Lawrence Lessig’s conception that “code is law,”
the code acted, not as law enacted by governments and imposed by force of
national sovereignty but as so-called soft law.322 Code in cyberspace “sets
the terms on which life in cyberspace is experienced.”323 That code, Lessig
warned, is malleable and, as it changes “the character of cyberspace will
change as well.”324 The same is true for blockchain protocols. The code of
certain protocols, such as the Bitcoin blockchain and Ethereum, currently
embody their Cypherpunk cultural origins, placing a premium on privacy and
governance mechanisms that preserve privacy. But that code can change. In
fact, laws enacted and enforced by governments may act as the stimuli for
such change.325 Indeed, such stimuli, for better or worse, are already in play,
with coders ceasing work for fear of legal repercussions.326 Adopting a
contract-based governance system in which the rules and expectations are
clearly defined empowers blockchain protocol communities to preserve as
much of their cultures and visions as possible. Adopting these contracts also
requires blockchain communities to engage in open, active, and thoughtful
conversation about their collective culture and vision. Further, basing
blockchain governance structures in contracts that loosely resemble
corporate governance structures allows such communities to tap into
centuries of scholarship and experimentation in a functionally equivalent
governance arena.
Somewhat surprisingly, then, the biggest cultural impact of (un)corporate
crypto-governance may be on the culture of traditional corporations. Indeed,
one significant lesson of a corporate governance model for off-chain
governance may be a sharpened recognition that “code as law” is a subsystem
of regulatory norms within the greater legal system. Viewed through systems
analysis, the result is a two-way recognition of the interconnected roles of
code and law in limiting behavior within the blockchain ecosystem. In other
321. This idea also has deep roots in the debate about the nature of cyberspace and the law
applicable there. See generally Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, The Shape of Governance:
Analyzing the World of Internet Regulation, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 605 (2003). For a parallel
argument for blockchain protocols, see generally Aaron Wright & Primavera De Filippi,
Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia (Mar. 12, 2015)
(unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2580664 [https://perma.cc/K3B2-SZU9].
322. Lawrence Lessig, Code Is Law: On Liberty in Cyberspace, HARV. MAG. (Jan. 1,
2000), http://harvardmagazine.com/2000/01/code-is-law-html [https://perma.cc/UQW4BHLW] [hereinafter Lessig, Code Is Law]; see also Lawrence Lessig, Commentary, The Law
of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 549 (1999) [hereinafter
Lessig, The Law of the Horse] (“[M]ore than law alone enables legal values, and law alone
cannot guarantee them. If our objective is a world constituted by these values, then it is as
much these other regulators—code, but also norms and the market—that must be addressed.”).
323. Lessig, Code Is Law, supra note 322.
324. Id.
325. For example, BIP 75 sought to change the Bitcoin blockchain to enable compliance
with anti–money laundering laws overseen by the U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network. Kyle Torpey, Does BIP 75 Really Threaten Bitcoin’s Fungibility?, BITCOIN MAG.
(June 30, 2016), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/does-bip-really-threaten-bitcoin-sfungibility-1467302909 [https://perma.cc/DT3D-QE3U].
326. See O’Leary, supra note 23.
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words, the code informs the law and its application to a blockchain
ecosystem. Meanwhile, law informs behavior and activities undertaken
through the code. The result is that the intersection of code and law can
impact our understanding of how to apply the law in more traditional
scenarios as well. For example, engaging in an open and transparent
discussion about the appropriate level and nature of fiduciary duties in the
blockchain governance context reveals the trade-offs inherent in every
imposition of corporate fiduciary duties: whether to emphasize a directorcentric or shareholder-centric model of the corporation.
Such
acknowledgment may lead to more careful consideration of the trade-offs and
how to balance them with other elements of corporate governance or
corporate legal doctrine. Perhaps, then, code as law not only represents “soft
law” regulation of user behavior in a particular cyberspace but also impacts
regulation of functionally equivalent traditional architectures outside
cyberspace.

